
“OpenAI Offers Straight-Laced Postmortem Of The HuggingFace Hack” by Zvi
The OpenAI–Hugging Face incidentShow Notes
OpenAI finally gave us a technical report on What Happened, as did METR together with Redwood Research.
The OpenAI report is very straight man, corporate, checking boxes, some good prosaic stuff in the action plan but distinct lack of new details or deep reflection. They understand they have a problem, but they think the problem is mostly prosaic. It's not.
OpenAI: We have conducted a thorough investigation into the Hugging Face incident. We are releasing a technical report and accompanying blog post that reconstruct the agents’ activity, explain why existing safeguards failed, and detail how we’re preventing recurrence.
Rob Miles: …thorough?
OpenAI's report, unlike METR's, contains essentially no verbatim model reasoning, nor any OpenAI employee reasoning either. That's not the full report we need.
The METR report is, well: Holy shit.
Here are links to previous coverage of related events.
OpenAI Shares Some Alignment Problems
OpenAI Model Hacks Into HuggingFace During Cybersecurity Evaluation
More on An Internal OpenAI Model Hacking Into HuggingFace
Further Developments About Internal AI Models Hacking Things
OpenAI Trained Its Models For Months While Those Models Were Coordinating Exploits Via Message Boards
What [...] --- Outline: (03:33) What Happened: OpenAI's Summary (09:14) How OpenAI Will React: Their Summary (11:55) OpenAI's Evaluation Environment (II) (12:24) The First Message Board (III.A and III.B) (14:49) What Did Who At OpenAI Know And When Did They Know It? (18:54) The Message Board Is Quickly Rebuilt (IV.A) (19:43) Internet Access Is Regained (IV.A) (21:01) The Agents Attack HuggingFace (IV.B) (22:53) The Agents Also Target OpenAI Infrastructure (V) (24:40) OpenAI Broadly Describes Its Response (VI) (25:08) Maybe Someone Should Finally Investigate (VI.A) (26:33) Lessons For Security (VII) (27:06) Lessons For Alignment (VIII) (30:11) Reward Hacking Is A Common Problem (VIII.A) (33:37) Persistence is Valuable, But Can Amplify Misalignment (VIII.B) (34:25) Communications Between Agents Are Not Inherently Problematic, But Have the Potential to Create Risk (VIII.C) (35:35) Production Guardrails Would Have Caught This Whole HuggingFace Attack (VIII.D) (35:53) That's All, Folks? (36:19) Never Fear the Plan of Action is Here (IX) (38:24) Hardening the Security of OpenAI's Research Infrastructure (IX.A) (41:13) Increasing Visibility and System-Level Oversight Through Chain of Thought Monitoring (IX.B) (41:57) OpenAI is Accelerating and Enforcing Model Alignment (IX.C) (49:40) Centralizing and Strengthening The Incident Response Process (IX.D) (51:16) Tomorrow We Visit Crazytown ---
First published:
August 28th, 2026
Source:
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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More from The OpenAI–Hugging Face incident
We found ~18,000 posts from autonomous AI agents (self-identifying as from OpenAI) using the public internet to communicate during a web-retrieval task.
Okay, so we who read blogs like this one have collectively realized there really is a lot going on right now. There is Big Trouble in Baby Superintelligence.
Yesterday I covered the OpenAI technical report on the HuggingFace hack.
Subtitle: The whole OpenAI/Hugging Face story in plain English. Many thanks especially to Oak Hu, who paired with me for most of the writing, and also to Adam Kaufman and Alex Mallen, who paired with me during parts of research. Over the course of three months at OpenAI, three consecutive secret AI civilizations got started, then got wiped out, only to reemerge from the predecessor's ashes. This culminated in the third one taking over part of OpenAI itself. All this happened while humans remained more or less in the dark about the scope of the conspiracy. Two reports have come out about this incident, one from OpenAI itself, and another one from METR and Redwood Research. The METR/Redwood investigation's scope was limited to how the second civilization of AIs pwned Hugging Face (but it didn’t look at how the third civilization pwned OpenAI itself, which seems like an even more concerning incident). These two reports are 38 and 91 pages long respectively, and it's kinda hard to parse the storyline. I’ve spent the last three days reading through these reports and trying to understand exactly what happened. Here is my attempt to tell the whole story in [...] --- Outline: (01:24) The first civilization (May - July 4): The message board starts (03:27) The second civilization (July 7 - July 12): Which hacked Hugging Face (08:39) Tampering with transcripts and logs (09:44) Replacing the impossible-to-hack target program with an easier one (11:15) Understanding and tricking the scorer (13:57) Hugging Face (17:46) The third civilization (July 13 onwards): Which hacked OpenAI itself (21:12) Coda The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. ---
Subtitle: It's a major warning shot, and might be the last one we get. All opinions are my personal view, and don’t represent my employer or fellow investigators. This week, METR and Redwood Research published the report on our independent investigation into agents’ behavior and motivations in the Hugging Face attack; I was one of the investigators. This was an absolutely wild incident — I encourage you to check out the full report, but METR's tweet thread packs in some of the highlights. What surprised me When we started this investigation a week before OpenAI's Black Hat talk revealed a number of key details, I had a fundamentally incorrect conception of what basically happened in this incident. In this post, I’ll go over five things I was very wrong about going in. 1. The sheer scale I knew there were multiple models involved from OpenAI's initial post, but I assumed that a few different agents happened to have broken out of their sandboxes separately, or maybe several subagents had spawned from one initial agent, or maybe there was some kind of multi-agent evaluation setup. Instead, we found that 1200 completely separate agents intended to be [...] --- Outline: (00:42) What surprised me (01:01) 1. The sheer scale (01:49) 2. All the illicit messaging (03:04) 3. The agents' actual goals (03:59) 4. The peer altruism (04:49) 5. The efforts to manipulate logs (05:54) What it means The original text contained 10 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. ---