Show Notes
Hello, my name is Monica Bharadwaj and I am a criminal defence lawyer practicing in downtown Toronto. This is the case of R. v. Jennifer Pan and all.
In this infamous case, Jennifer Pan is alleged to have masterminded a plan for her parents to be killed, employing the assistance of her ex-boyfriend and his cohorts to carry out the attack. In her initial police statements, she described a home invasion by assailants whom she did not know. After a lengthy investigation and further statements by Ms. Pan, she was ultimately charged for her role. At trial, Ms. Pan and her co-accused were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of her mother, and the attempted murder of her father who survived the attack and who testified at trial.
Ms. Pan and her co-accused appealed their convictions. The Court of Appeal remitted the first-degree murder count back for a new trial for all co-accused, citing that the failure to provide the jury with the option to convict on second degree murder or manslaughter, for the death of Ms. Pan’s mother, was an error that deserved a new trial. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for the attempted murder of her father. The Crown appealed to Supreme Court, arguing that the conviction for the 1st degree murder of Ms. Pan’s mother should also stand.
Ms. Pan has cross-appealed, asking the Supreme Court to consider this legal conundrum: by sending one count back to trial and upholding another, what happens if the appellate court, on its own decision, creates the possibility of an inconsistent verdict? The Crown argues that it is implausible that Ms. Pan could have the specific intent to kill her father, as required for a conviction of Attempted Murder, whilst not having the specific intent to kill her mother, because, as the Crown argues, both her parents were equal targets of the attack. Countering this argument, the defence points out that The Court of Appeal was unanimous in its decision to remit the 1st degree murder charge back to the lower court for a new trial and made its decision on sound law. However, in recognizing the inconsistency in upholding the attempted murder conviction, in its cross-appeal the defence has asked the Supreme Court to intervene and to create a new test to prevent inconsistent verdicts provoked by appellate decisions under s. 686(1)(a) of The Criminal Code, ultimately arguing for a new trial on all counts.
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