Show Notes
This article was written in April 1990 by Sir Michael Alexander, who was serving as the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to NATO. It reflects on the historic months that followed Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall – the so-called ‘end of history’, per Francis Fukuyama.
In the article, Sir Michael offers an eerily prophetic take on the future of the Alliance in the post-Cold War period. Highlighting the need to nurture the transatlantic bond and NATO’s growing role as a forum for political consultation with partner countries outside of the Alliance, he optimistically discusses new opportunities, like stronger relations with a transformed Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact countries. He warns that the Soviet Union may eventually backslide and re-emerge as an aggressor, particularly under new leadership, and foresees new dangers emanating in the late 1990s as a result of developments in the South and Middle East. On a more positive note, he also anticipated a unified Germany becoming part of the Alliance.
Sir Michael was not, however, Nostradamus, and he did get a couple of things wrong. We will let you discover the rest on your own, but regardless of his accurate or inaccurate predictions, this article – written at the dawn of an exciting and hopeful time in NATO’s history – presents remarkable parallels with events that are presently shaping NATO’s direction. It was as true then as it is now: NATO’s purpose withstands the test of time. NATO’s role in a changing world is to provide security for its members while remaining capable and flexible enough to tackle emerging and (perhaps) unpredictable challenges.
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