Show Notes
A rogue AI editing agent deleted all of the footage for season two of the Swedish version of The Challenge, pushing its release into 2027 while the editing work gets redone. Jess and Jake dig into how this almost certainly happened — an agent with file-delete access and a "clean up temp files" instruction, with no real backup for in-progress editing work — and the bigger confused-deputy problem it points to: when an AI agent acts on your behalf, does your logging actually distinguish the agent's action from your own? For most organizations right now, the honest answer is no.
They also cover Bank of America running Anthropic's Mythos model against its own internal applications, finding enough vulnerabilities to bring on 1,000 third-party contractors on top of the 3,000 employees already working the backlog — and why the bank trusted AI to find the vulnerabilities but not to write and ship the patches. Plus: the FTC finally issuing subpoenas to OpenAI and Anthropic after state AGs have been sitting on a similar effort for months, and Jake's cloud-provider horror stories, including Google's accidental deletion of an Australian pension fund's entire tenant and the standing lesson to never deploy in AWS us-east-1
More from Breach Please
Jake Williams and Jess Hebenstreit dig into the week's vulnerability pile-up — PHP, GitLab, Node.js, and a LightLLM supply-chain keylogger — and the much bigger story blowing up the week: ChainGuard's CEO unilaterally broke the coordinated disclosure embargo on the PHP vulnerability, posting technical details hours before the agreed release. They cover why that decision may have put the final nail in coordinated disclosure's coffin, Jake's fire department (not bucket brigade) framework for arguing a changed risk landscape to your board, and the pushback on a widely-shared LinkedIn post telling security leaders to 'just ask your board for the basics.' They also get into whether AI model providers bear responsibility for accelerating vulnerability discovery, how to tell your board the risk calculus has actually changed instead of just asking for the same resources again, and why cybersecurity has become a far more cutthroat, specialized field than the one they came up in. Spicy/rant warning: Jess does not hold back on this one. Topics covered: - ChainGuard's CEO breaking the coordinated PHP vulnerability disclosure embargo, and the industry backlash that followed - Why Jake and Jess think this may be the beginning of the end for coordinated disclosure as it's worked until now - The week's vulnerability pile-up: PHP, a new GitLab flaw, Node.js, and a LightLLM supply-chain keylogger compromise - Jake's fire department vs. bucket brigade analogy for explaining a changed risk landscape to your board - The backlash to a viral LinkedIn post telling security leaders to go ask their boards for 'the basics' - Whether AI model providers share responsibility for accelerating vulnerability discovery and exploitation - Why cybersecurity has become a more cutthroat, specialized field than the one Jake and Jess came up in Sources: Jason Clinton (Deputy CISO, Anthropic): https://x.com/JasonDClinton/status/2113325263157395456 ChainGuard CEO: https://lnkd.in/p/gufhMCU7 Marcus Hutchins: https://lnkd.in/p/gwzFmFeE FireEye: https://lnkd.in/p/gZAW7tAA Join our Discord: https://discord.gg/wYJnTpczV
Jake Williams and Jess Hebenstreit break down three vulnerabilities that blew up in the same 24 hours: a brand-new CVSS 10 unauthenticated RCE in self-managed GitLab (not the one from October 12 — a different flaw, patch again), PHP's actively-exploited critical vulnerability and why 'we don't have PHP' is almost never actually true, and the eMudra certificate authority mess, where researchers found ECC keys so weak that one of them was literally the number 4. They also get into when a vulnerability response becomes an incident, why 'we're waiting for evidence of exploitation' usually isn't a defensible position, Jake's three-bucket framework for prioritizing patches (business-as-usual, next outage window, or create-an-outage-now), and why a fast, imperfect postmortem beats a perfect one that never happens. Topics covered: - The new GitLab CVSS 10 unauthenticated RCE affecting every version back to 7.0 (2014) — distinct from the October 12 patch - PHP's critical, actively-exploited vulnerability: where PHP actually hides in your environment (appliances, admin interfaces) even if you think you don't run it - eMudra's catastrophically weak TLS/ECC private keys, the browser and package-manager fallout, and why a clean certificate transparency log doesn't mean you're safe - Who actually has the authority to accept the risk of staying unpatched, and how to make that case in dollars - Running vulnerability response like an incident without calling it an incident - Jake's three-bucket patch prioritization framework and why quick postmortems beat delayed ones
Two critical PHP vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618) are getting patches today — a remote code execution bug spanning PHP 5 through current, with early severity estimates as high as a CVSS 10 (PHP's own advisory puts it at 9.2). Guest Richy fills in for Jake this episode and joins Jess to break down what's actually exploitable, why this hits vendor appliances hardest (you can't just drop an EDR on a closed-source box), and the one thing they disagree on: wait for a CISA KEV listing before acting, or patch now if you're internet-facing? (Jess says now.) Also in this episode: Why PHP is still everywhere you don't expect it — WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, Magento, MediaWiki, Laravel, and Symfony, plus the vendor appliances and container images nobody remembers are running it. Richy's "proactive threat response" framework — running a hair-on-fire vulnerability like an incident, without calling it one, so you keep the communication lines and decision speed without the regulatory/insurance baggage. How to actually find PHP in your environment without a reliable CMDB: attack surface management tooling, EDR process queries, and vendor SBOMs. Guest: Richy, filling in for Jake Williams this episode. Sources: PHP's official advisory: https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5 Watchtowr's FAQ (CVE-2026-109618): https://watchtowr.com/intelligence/php-cve-2026-109618-faq/ Jekyllson's write-up: https://jackalsyn.com/posts/php-up-2026.html Join our Discord: https://discord.gg/wYJnTpczV
Hashcat core developer EvilMog joins Jess and Jake to explain why so many "NTLM v1 is disabled" Windows networks are still exploitable. MSCHAPv2 and PPTP VPN are cryptographically equivalent to NTLM v1 — so a rogue RADIUS server and one unchecked "verify the certificate" box can hand an attacker domain admin, no matter how long or random your password is.
ConnectWise disclosed over the weekend that threat actors used existing OAuth credentials to take over Microsoft 365 tenants through its Cloud Management platform — Huntress has confirmed 162 tenants impacted so far, with ConnectWise's own SkyKick backup service shut off entirely as a result. Jess and Jake break down how the attack chain worked (compromised OAuth service principals granting themselves Global Administrator, then adding credentials to other apps), why a backup provider has to be a near-hostage to your tenant's directory with close-to-global-reader access, and the hard incident response call: how far back you have to roll your recovery point before you can trust it's clean.