Show Notes
Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.
Reference: Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One (Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.) Randomly Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (from the clausewitz.com website.): https://www.clausewitz.com/MP4/romp2.mp4 Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.) Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar (piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517
More from The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare
It seems to be popular to publish lists of five, seven, or more items that represent whatever the author thinks it is important for others to know. For this episode, I decided to go along with this trend. I came up with seven deadly sins in fighting a war. These sins, things never to do, apply to the decision to go to war – this includes the decisions associated with defending one’s nation when attacked.
Is Just War Theory still relevant to war and war fighting in the world today? Are the criteria of Just Cause, Right Intent, Legitimate Authority, and Proportionality, and Last Resort tools to restrain nations from going to war, or have these principles been twisted into excuses for going to war. This is part of the argument Pope Leo XIV makes in his recent Encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas, in which he is reported to say that Just War Theory is outdated. Is this true? If so, what does it mean? That is the subject of this episode of The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Every August and September, the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan in 1945 seems to be a topic of discussion. This year, I decided to take that on and place it into the Just War framework, specifically jus in bello, or justice in the conduct of war. Just War Theory is a recurring topic in this podcast series. I believe that this framework is critical as a restraint on war and to establishing a just and lasting peace after war. (I still intend on addressing Pope Leo’s statement that Just War Theory is outdated.) This episode builds on information my guests and I presented in previous episodes, and particularly Episodes 13-16, and Episode 17 which described Just War Theory in theory and practice. As a side note, the web service that hosts these podcasts informed me that the episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare now have 50,000 downloads. I know that many podcasters get this for a single episode. Since I don’t do this for the clicks, but just to share my thoughts on war, I was somewhat impressed that so many people bothered to download my thoughts. Thank you.
The common definition of a mercenary is a soldier paid to fight in an armed conflict for a country that is not his or her own. The terrorist organization Hizballah operates in Lebanon, fighting against Israel, with financial, material and organizational support from Iran, and frequently under the direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Under the common definition, could Hizballah be considered mercenaries fighting for Iran? Royce de Melo, Doug Brooks, and I discuss this question in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Is war rational? The great philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, was a product of three schools of education: the classical tradition of Aristotle, the enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and the practical experience of Napoleon. Each of these three challenged and opposed the other two. His work, On War expresses this tension and opposition. In his effort to develop a comprehensive theory of war, he had to deal with the many instances where the reality of war seemed to defy any coherent framework, where the things which should happen in war are contradicted by what actually happens. (This fits with his assigning the element of probability and chance to the military leg of his famous triad.) “Consequently,” he wrote, “it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments…” If it did, he concluded, then in the end, war would never need to be fought. But wars are fought. Is war itself then, irrational?