ASecuritySite Podcast

Apple Steps Back Their Security

ASecuritySite Podcast

Show Notes

The fallback for law enforcement agencies has always been the place where files are stored, and all the best encryption within end-to-end communications will not stop unencrypted files at rest from being examined. But when the user encrypts data into the Cloud and where they hold their own keys, that's when the nightmare begins for them. The rise of cybersecurity on the Internet Let's pinpoint the start of cybersecurity on the Internet to the 1970s. This saw the rise of the Lucifer cipher and saw banks properly protect their communications. This led to the 56-bit DES encryption method, and which led many to suspect that the size of the key had been crippled due to the demands of law enforcement agencies. But, there was an even greater threat to these agencies evolving: public key encryption. The rise of public key encryption started in the mid-1970s when Whitfield Diffie and Marty Hellman first defined a method that allowed us to secure our communications using a key exchange method — the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. And then, almost a year later, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman presented a way to digitally sign a hash of data with the RSA signature method, and where a server could sign a hash of data with its private key and for this to be verified with an associated public key. For almost the first time, we could digitally verify that we were connecting to a valid system. But, the RSA method could not only sign data, it could also encrypt things with a public key, and where the private key could now be used to decrypt the data. It was a nightmare come true for law enforcement agencies. What was magical about these methods was that you could encrypt data with keys that could be created for every single session — and generated and stored on user devices. User devices could even pick the keys that they wanted and their sizes and security levels. The days of security being crippled were fading fast. While the first versions of SSL were crippled by the demands for limits on this security, eventually, SSL evolved into something that could not be controlled. But, still files could still be viewed on user devices, so it was not a major problem for investigators. Then, in 2001, the AES method was standardized by NIST, along with the newly defined SHA-256 hashing method, and we basically had all the security methods in place. But all of this did not please law enforcement agencies. For them, the rise of cryptography removed the opportunities that they had had in the past and where they could mass harvest information from phone calls or from the postal service. For the first time in history, citizens were free from spying from both those who protect nations and those who attack citizens. The Wild West years of the early Internet — and where little could be trusted — have subsided, and now we have systems which take encryption from one service on a device to another service on another device — end-to-end encryption. End-to-end encryption For some, end-to-end encryption was the final nail in the coffin for those who wish to monitor the tracks of citizens. This is data in motion, and where law enforcement agencies could still peak at data at rest and where the data is actually stored. Once data in motion and data at rest were encrypted, the door was effectively closed for peaking at data. And, so, companies such as Apple advanced new methods which protected data at rest, and where all of a citizen's data could be encrypted onto the Cloud without Apple having the encryption key to view any part of it. For this, they created the Advanced Data Protection service:

This service protects things like citizens' photos, iCloud Drive, and wallet passes. For almost the first time, we had almost perfect security — and where five decades of advancement were finally coming together. We now have end-to-end encryption in apps such as What's App and Signal, and Apple provides secure data storage. But, some governments around the world saw the

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