Ville de Québec v. Jardins de Vérone S.E.C. (41748)
Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)Show Notes
The respondent, Jardins de Vérone S.E.C., owned land within the territory of the appellant, Ville de Québec (“City”). The land was officially designated as “serviced vacant land”, a particular that was included in the information concerning the unit of assessment on the assessment roll. On March 1, 2018, the respondent received a building permit from the City for the erection of a building with 109 dwellings. The work began on April 1, 2018, and was carried out without interruption as of that date. In July 2018, the respondent applied to the City’s assessment department to have the “serviced vacant land” particular removed from the information on the assessment roll. In October 2018, the municipal assessor’s representative denied that request on the ground that no action had been omitted by the assessor, having regard to ss. 32 and 244.36 of the Act respecting municipal taxation, CQLR, c. F-2.1 (AMT), and that there was therefore no basis for making an alteration. The respondent then brought a proceeding before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (ATQ) under s. 132.1 of the AMT, seeking an order requiring the municipal assessor to alter the information on the roll so that the “serviced vacant land” particular was removed, in accordance with ss. 174, 57.1.1 and 244.36 of the AMT. The building was not entered on the roll until early summer in 2019. On December 16, 2019, the ATQ rendered a decision in the respondent’s favour, confirming that, as soon as a building is situated on land, the assessor must alter the assessment roll by removing the “serviced vacant land” particular, regardless of its value. The ATQ ordered that the “serviced vacant land” particular be removed from the assessment roll retroactively to the date when the work had begun.The Court of Québec allowed the City’s appeal. The ATQ’s decision was set aside and replaced. In the court’s view, the interpretation of s. 244.36 of the AMT adopted by the ATQ was not “correct” under the standard of review applicable in this case.The Superior Court dismissed the application filed by the respondent for judicial review of the Court of Québec’s decision. The reasonableness of the Court of Québec’s decision was upheld.The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal. It set aside the decisions of the Court of Québec and the Superior Court and restored the ATQ’s decision. The Court of Appeal held that, although the Court of Québec did not owe deference to a statutory interpretation by the ATQ, it still could not substitute its erroneous interpretation for the ATQ’s correct interpretation. The Court of Appeal accordingly found that the Court of Québec had not properly applied the correctness standard and therefore, contrary to what the Superior Court had concluded, the Court of Québec’s decision should have been found unreasonable. Argued Date 2026-05-12 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Standard of review — Municipal law — Taxation — Property assessments — Interpretation of concept of “serviced vacant land” under Act respecting municipal taxation — Manner in which Court of Québec must apply standard for appellate intervention (correctness) to conclusions of law in administrative decision — Whether Court of Québec performed its appellate function reasonably — Courts of Justice Act, CQLR, c. T-16, s. 83.1 — Act respecting municipal taxation, CQLR, c. F-2.1, ss. 32, 57.1.1, 131.2, 174 para. 13.1.1(a), 244.36 and 244.49. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).
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At the end of June 2010, an amendment to s. 224 of the Consumer Protection Act, CQLR, c. P 40.1 (“CPA”), came into force; it aimed to eliminate the business practice that consisted in advertising a good or service at a price that did not include the full amount that the consumer had to pay at the time of payment. Two weeks after that amendment, the appellant Michael Silas, represented by the Consumers’ Union and a person designated for the purposes of the class action, consulted Air Canada’s Internet site to acquire a ticket. Mr. Silas had to go through three navigation steps. Between the first and last step, the ticket price increased by $124.46, that is, by the addition of taxes, fees, charges and other surcharges. The appellants sought a reduction in the price paid and an award of punitive damages. Air Canada, for its part, argued that the doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy rendered that provision of the CPA constitutionally inapplicable. Alternatively, it argued that it did not breach the Act.The Superior Court excluded the application of the doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy. It refused to impose a reduction in price, because the presumption of prejudice did not apply and because the prohibited practice was not capable of influencing the consumer’s behaviour. It also refused to award punitive damages against Air Canada, because the evidence showed that it was not necessary in order to prevent a repetition of the conduct. The Court of Appeal confirmed the Superior Court’s analysis regarding the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. It concluded, however, that the trial judge committed a reviewable error concerning the presumption of prejudice but did not impose a reduction in price on Air Canada, because there was no basis on which to quantify the reduction of the obligation to which the consumers were entitled. It, however, awarded punitive damages, because, in its view, Air Canada demonstrated carelessness and serious negligence with respect to consumers. Argued Date 2026-10-16 Keywords Consumer protection — Pre contractual obligation to honour advertised price as required by Consumer Protection Act — Class action — Claim for compensatory damages — Claim for punitive damages — Doctrine of federal paramountcy — Whether s. 224(c) creates contractual obligation for merchants to honour advertised price when consumer decides to enter into contract — To obtain reduction of obligation of s. 272(c) in case of offence under s. 224(c), whether consumer must provide evidence other than evidence of commission of offence — Whether restrictive interpretation of ss. 224(c) and 272(c) by lower courts undermined effectiveness of Act and legislature’s intention to eliminate drip pricing practices and other unlawful practices — Consumer Protection Act, CQLR, c. P 40.1, ss. 224 and 272. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).
Ontario Place is an urban park on the Lake Ontario waterfront. To facilitate its redevelopment, the Ontario Legislature passed the Rebuilding Ontario Place Act, 2023, S.O. 2023, c. 25, Sch. 2. The Act exempts Ontario Place from regulation under the Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.18, and the Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18, and from the City of Toronto’s authority to regulate noise. The Act also extinguishes causes of action, and related remedies, against the Crown and its agents that might otherwise arise out of the redevelopment of Ontario Place. However, the Act preserves the ability to bring applications for judicial review.Applicant Ontario Place Protectors brought an application to challenge the constitutionality of the Act on the bases that: (i) the Act insulates state action from judicial scrutiny and thereby violates s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867; and (ii) the exemptions from environmental and heritage legislation and from municipal noise regulations constitute a breach of public trust.The application judge dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Argued Date 2026-10-15 Keywords Constitutional law – Courts – Core jurisdiction – Crown law – Crown liability – Ontario Legislature enacting legislation to facilitate redevelopment of urban park – Legislation extinguishing causes of action against Crown and exempting redevelopment from environmental and heritage legislation – Whether legislation removing s. 96 superior court core jurisdiction – Whether legislation breaching doctrine of public trust – Rebuilding Ontario Place Act, 2023, S.O. 2023, c. 25, Sch. 2, ss. 9, 10, 11, 17. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).
Cold Ocean Salmon Inc. agreed to sell several trout farms to Nova Fish Farms Inc. under an agreement of purchase and sale. The trout farms were on property leased from the provincial government and were licensed and regulated by both federal and provincial governments. Therefore, sale of the farms was conditional on government approval. The agreement was signed in February 2020 and did not state a fixed or outside closing date. Instead, it provided that the closing would occur seven days following the completion of certain conditions precedent including receiving government approval. The agreement required each party to take the necessary steps to obtain government approval as promptly as practicable following signing and that the parties were to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain approval before closing. The agreement included a clause that stated that time shall be of the essence of the agreement.Neither party took any steps to effectuate the agreement until June 2021 when Nova Fish submitted transfer applications to the provincial government. The government approved the applications in October 2021. Nova Fish told Cold Ocean’s solicitor of the approval in December 2021 and that Nova Fish wanted to proceed to close the transaction. The parties had direct communications and communications through their lawyers on several occasions through the spring of 2022. In May 2022, Cold Ocean told Nova Fish that it did not intend to proceed with the transaction.Nova Fish sued Cold Ocean seeking specific performance of the agreement. Cold Ocean pleaded in defence that Nova Fish was in breach of the agreement because of its delay in obtaining government approval and that Cold Ocean was entitled to terminate the agreement because of that breach. At a summary trial, it was determined that Nova Fish breached the agreement because it did not act as promptly as practicable, or use reasonable commercial efforts to obtain government approval. The time is of the essence clause applied to the terms of the agreement and entitled Cold Ocean to terminate the agreement. Cold Ocean was not required to prompt Nova Fish to comply with the agreement and it did not waive the breaches by Nova Fish and it was not obliged to allow Nova Fish to cure its breaches. Nova Fish’s action for specific performance was dismissed.The Court of Appeal allowed Nova Fish’s appeal. The trial judge’s finding that Nova Fish breached the agreement was not disturbed, however, it was determined that the trial judge erred by finding that the time is of the essence clause applied to the obligations that Nova Fish breached and the trial judge erred in finding that Cold Ocean was entitled to terminate the agreement because of Nova Fish’s breach of those obligations. The Court of Appeal granted Nova Fish’s request for an order of specific performance. Argued Date 2026-10-14 Keywords Contracts — Interpretation — Time is of the essence — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by interpreting a time is of the essence clause as an extricable question of law, in isolation from the agreement as a whole, without regard to the factual matrix, and without considering the objective intentions of the parties — Whether, under the modern approach to contractual interpretation, a time is of the essence clause can apply to a contextual temporal obligation where the parties so intend. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).
Applicants Durrell Diggs and Ryan Taylor Wilband were both inmates on remand at the Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility. At the relevant time, the facility was suffering staffing shortages which resulted in rotational lockdowns of inmates. The applicants brought habeas corpus applications arguing that the rotational lockdowns unlawfully deprived them of their residual liberty.The application judge declared that the lockdowns were unlawful. The respondent Attorney General of Nova Scotia appealed. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and set the declarations aside. Argued Date 2026-10-13 Keywords Courts – Jurisdiction – Prerogative writs – Habeas corpus – Correctional facility detainees challenging legality of rotational lockdowns imposed due to staff shortages – Application judge declaring lockdowns unlawful – Declarations set aside on appeal – Whether placement in solitary confinement as result of operational or policy decisions reviewable by way of habeas corpus Notes (Nova Scotia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).
The respondents, Mr. Gabriel-Liberty Wall and Mr. Gregory Westgarde, former members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, each submitted independent access requests pursuant to s. 23 of the Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c. 63 (PIPA) for the disclosure of their personal information held by the applicants Grand Forks Congregation Jehovah’s Witnesses and Coldstream Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, their former Jehovah’s Witnesses’ congregations. Mr. Wall’s request was denied by the Grand Forks Congregation on the grounds that the records contained “privileged and confidential religious communications”. Similarly, Mr. Westgarde was initially informed by the Coldstream Congregation that no personal information was held, but the Congregation later acknowledged that while personal records did exist, they constituted confidential religious communications protected under the common law and the Charter. Dissatisfied with the responses received, the respondents requested that the British Columbia Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) review the congregations’ decisions. The matter was referred to mediation by the Commissioner. After the failed mediation, the Commissioner assigned an adjudicator to conduct an inquiry under s. 50 of PIPA. Because of the constitutional issues raised, notice was also given to the respondent the Attorney General of British Columbia. Despite finding that the impugned provisions infringed the religious freedoms of applicants and congregational elders Mr. John Vabuolas and Mr. Paul Sidhu under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the adjudicator concluded that the infringement was justified under s. 1. The adjudicator accordingly ordered the Grand Forks and Coldstream Congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses to produce all records in their custody or control containing Mr. Wall and Mr. Westgarde’s personal information, for her review as the Commissioner’s delegate. The applicants filed a petition for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision. The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the petition for judicial review and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2026-10-09 Keywords Charter of rights — Freedom of religion — Right to access personal information held by religious congregations — Power of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia under the Personal Information Protection Act to order the production of documents — When is private and confidential religious information subject to disclosure under Canadian secular law (e.g., the Personal Information Protection Act)? — Does the Personal Information and Protection Act of British Columbia empower the Privacy Commissioner to infringe s. 2(a) of the Charter? — Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c. 63, ss. 1 (“organization”), 3, 23(1)(a), 38(1)(b) and 52 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).