Morrison v. Yippee Entertainment, Inc. — 9th Cir. (Oct 30, 2026)

We hear the Seventh Circuit in Dylan Jones versus Chad Jennings. Jones says a painful lump developed behind his knee at Robinson Correctional Center, but his requests for care went unanswered for months. He says an X-ray was followed by a Baker's cyst diagnosis without follow-up care; a later MRI showed an untreated meniscus tear. He sued the warden and prison medical contractor Wexford, alleging that cost-cutting policies led to the denial of necessary treatment. The district court dismissed his second amended complaint, finding too few facts connecting his injury to the warden's knowledge or a company policy. Jones will ask to revive the suit, saying the court demanded evidence before he could obtain it through discovery. The defendants will contend that his allegations remain too vague. The recurring term Monell concerns liability for a policy or practice that caused a constitutional violation, not merely an employee's wrongdoing. Rule Eight requires a plausible claim supported by factual allegations. Rule Nine, subsection B, demands particular detail for fraud or mistake, but permits knowledge to be alleged generally. That does not remove Rule Eight's requirement.

The Fourth Circuit hears Herring's appeal from robbery and firearm convictions. In December 2020, armed robbers stole electronics and cash from two Maryland phone stores: a Verizon retailer and an AT&T retailer. A jury found Herring guilty of two Hobbs Act robberies and two charges of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The Hobbs Act makes robbery a federal crime when it affects interstate commerce—business across state lines. Herring will argue that prosecutors failed to prove that connection for each robbery. The government will contend that the stores' interstate operations and the stolen goods provided enough evidence. You'll also hear about Rules 701 and 702. Lay opinion testimony must rest on the witness's own perception and be helpful, rather than draw on specialized knowledge. Expert testimony requires appropriate qualifications and reliable methods. That distinction frames the dispute over police testimony about investigative practices. A harmless evidentiary error is one that did not substantially influence the verdict.

The Fourth Circuit considers Dr. Harwani's claim that Moses Cone Hospital revoked his permission to perform interventional heart procedures because of race. After a heart-attack procedure in 2019, the hospital suspended those privileges, later making the restriction permanent. It cited patient-safety and staff-communication concerns. Harwani says his care was appropriate and white doctors received more favorable treatment. He sued under Section 1981, which protects equal contract rights regardless of race. The district court granted summary judgment to the hospital and another physician, finding insufficient evidence of discrimination. The appeal asks whether his evidence is enough for a jury to consider. You'll hear SCAD: a tear in the wall of a coronary artery. You'll also hear McDonnell Douglas, a framework moving from an initial discrimination showing, to a stated nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, to evidence of pretext—a cover for discrimination. Harwani will argue his performance record, comparisons with other physicians and shifting explanations warrant a trial. The defendants will contend the comparisons fail and the restriction reflected genuine patient-care concerns.

The Fourth Circuit hears a challenge to EPA's approval of West Virginia's regional haze plan. The Clean Air Act aims to reduce human-caused haze that obscures views in protected national parks and wilderness areas. The plan required no additional pollution controls at the coal plants in dispute. EPA initially proposed rejecting the plan, then changed its policy and approved it. National Parks Conservation Association and Sierra Club ask the court to set that approval aside. They say EPA overlooked affordable improvements and failed to explain why previously inadequate analysis became adequate. You'll hear the uniform rate of progress, or glide path: a benchmark toward natural visibility, not a finding that the air is already clear. The four statutory factors are compliance costs, time needed, energy and non-air environmental impacts, and a facility's remaining useful life. EPA and West Virginia will defend a presumption of reasonable progress when those factors have been considered and affected areas are ahead of the glide path. Petitioners will contend that this approach unlawfully weakens the required review.

The Fourth Circuit considers Eric Keller's claims that Experian mishandled a dispute about his credit report. Keller says his bank, Truist, mistakenly marked his car loan paid off and refused further payments, then reopened the account and reported him as delinquent. He disputed the reporting with Experian, which sought verification from Truist, and Truist confirmed its reporting. Keller says the unresolved delinquency prevented him from obtaining a mortgage. He sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which generally requires credit bureaus to reasonably reinvestigate disputed information. The district court dismissed his individual claims, treating the dispute as one about his legal obligations to the bank. It later dismissed his proposed class claim for lack of standing, finding no adequate link between his mortgage injury and Experian's delay. You'll hear tradelines: the individual account entries in a credit report. Keller will argue Experian could investigate contradictions in its own files. Experian will contend it was not required to decide the underlying legal dispute with Truist.