Barnett, et al. v. City of San Jose — 9th Cir. (Oct 21, 2026)

William Woods appeals summary judgment for the City of Detroit in an employment case. The dispute involves a disability-retirement application. On April fifth, twenty eighteen, Detroit's Police and Fire Retirement System accepted its medical director's recommendation and approved Woods's application for duty-disability retirement. Approval of a pension and notice of a final employment decision are not necessarily the same event. That distinction matters when a filing deadline turns on when a challenged decision was made and communicated. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or E E O C, receives administrative charges of workplace discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act uses these charge-filing procedures. In Michigan, disability-discrimination charges against covered employers generally have a three-hundred-day filing deadline. This is a deadline for the agency charge, not for filing a federal lawsuit. You will hear references to Delaware State College versus Ricks. There, the Supreme Court distinguished a decision denying tenure, made and communicated to an employee, from his later departure under a terminal contract. The later end of employment did not restart the filing clock. Applying that distinction requires identifying the challenged act and when it became final and was communicated. Summary judgment is a ruling without trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Equitable tolling, also mentioned in the argument, is a potentially available equitable exception to a filing deadline, not an automatic extension.

Telecommunications industry groups challenge federal rules governing what companies must do when customers' private information is exposed. This is a challenge to a regulation, not a damages suit over one particular hack. Earlier breach rules focused on customer proprietary network information, or C P N I: information about a customer's telephone service, such as call destinations and usage. The disputed order, adopted in December twenty twenty-three and published in twenty twenty-four, also covers personally identifiable information, or P I I, such as a name combined with a government identification number. It expands the definition of a breach to include inadvertent disclosures, with a good-faith employee exception, and changes notification requirements for customers and federal authorities. The history matters. In twenty sixteen, the F C C adopted a broader privacy order that included breach reporting. In twenty seventeen, Congress passed, and the President signed, a resolution disapproving that order. Under the Congressional Review Act, section eight-oh-one, subsection b, paragraph two, a disapproved rule cannot be reissued in substantially the same form. A new rule that is substantially the same is also barred, unless Congress later specifically authorizes it. The question is whether this newer order crosses that line. The industry associations, joined by a relay-service provider, asked the Sixth Circuit to set the new rules aside. A three-judge panel rejected the challenge in twenty twenty-five. In July twenty twenty-six, the court agreed to rehear the case en banc, before the full court, and vacated that panel decision. This is the October twenty-first rehearing. Roman Martinez will argue for the challengers that the new breach-reporting rules are substantially the same as the ones Congress rejected. Adam Sorensen will defend the F C C, arguing that changes to the covered information, breach definition and reporting obligations make the rules sufficiently different. There is also a dispute over statutory authority. Section two-oh-one, subsection b, addresses just and reasonable carrier practices; section two-twenty-two specifically addresses customer privacy. Section two-twenty-five concerns telecommunications relay services, which help people with hearing or speech disabilities communicate by telephone. The lawyers disagree about how these provisions authorize, or limit, the expanded protections.

Victor Roberts challenges the denial of federal habeas relief from a California murder conviction. The prosecution's case was that he supplied a gun to another man, who fatally shot someone outside a convenience store. A jury convicted Roberts of second-degree murder. The jury also heard Roberts speaking to a police agent posing as another detainee. His defense was that intimidation made those admissions unreliable. The trial judge restricted questions about the agent's physical appearance to protect his identity, while allowing evidence about his gang-member persona. Roberts says that restriction prevented a meaningful defense. The state appellate court rejected his challenge. The federal district court denied his habeas petition, but allowed an appeal on the cross-examination and harmless-error issues. Habeas corpus is a challenge to the legality of custody, not another trial. Section twenty-two fifty-four limits federal relief from state convictions, including special deference to state-court decisions. A merely mistaken ruling is not necessarily an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Crane versus Kentucky recognizes that evidence about how a confession was obtained can bear on its reliability even when the confession is legally voluntary. Courts may still impose reasonable evidentiary limits. Whether this restriction left Roberts a meaningful defense remains disputed. The panel also addresses filing timeliness and the prison mailbox rule. Under Appellate Rule four, a qualifying deposit of a notice of appeal in the prison's internal mail system can count as filing, rather than its later arrival at court. The rule has requirements, including use of a legal-mail system when one exists. Another term in that discussion is in forma pauperis: permission to proceed without prepaying court fees because of financial inability.

Jermaine Bunn appeals a federal firearm conviction. Police found him unconscious in a vehicle containing a gun. Because he had a prior felony conviction, possessing that firearm was prohibited by federal law. A jury found him guilty. The unusual dispute concerns what happened before trial. Bunn repeatedly said he wanted to plead guilty. The judge initially announced that he would adjudge Bunn guilty, then questioned whether Bunn understood and admitted possessing the gun. The judge stopped the hearing for further consultation. At a later hearing, Bunn chose a trial. Bunn argues that his earlier plea had already been accepted and should govern sentencing. The government says his answers showed uncertainty about what he was admitting, so the judge properly gave him more time to consult his lawyer. Rule eleven governs guilty pleas. A plea colloquy is the judge's questioning to check the defendant's understanding, rights and voluntary choice. The rule separately requires a factual basis before judgment. The parties dispute how those requirements apply here. Actual possession means knowing physical control. Constructive possession means knowingly having the right and intention to exercise control, even without holding the item. Being near a gun is not enough. Acceptance of responsibility can lower the sentencing-guideline range, but a guilty plea alone does not guarantee that reduction. Plain-error review concerns obvious errors affecting important rights that were not properly raised below. The Speedy Trial Act generally uses a seventy-day clock, with specified delays excluded. Some exclusions are automatic; an ends-of-justice continuance requires recorded reasons weighing the need for delay against a prompt trial. The parties dispute which rule covers the interrupted plea hearing. Marisa Serrat will seek sentencing based on Bunn's earlier plea. Laura Ford for the United States will defend the conviction and sentence.

Matthew Thomas, a former quality-compliance director at Premier Home Health Care, challenges the dismissal of his whistleblower lawsuit. He alleged that the company billed Medicaid for services not properly provided, including care lacking required physician orders and nursing assessments, and failed to return overpayments. He also says he was fired for reporting the problems to management. The False Claims Act lets a private person, called a relator, sue in the government's name over fraud involving public funds. Here, the federal and state governments declined to take over the case; Thomas pursued it himself. The district judge dismissed his federal claims before trial and denied another amendment to the complaint. That was a decision about whether the allegations were legally sufficient, not a trial finding that fraud did or did not occur. Rule nine B requires particularity: specific facts describing the alleged fraud. Chorches and Gallian permit pleading without identified invoices when specific facts support a strong inference of false claims and show why the identifying information is peculiarly within the company's knowledge. The judges question whether Thomas has supplied that explanation. Regulatory noncompliance does not automatically establish a false claim. Materiality concerns whether a misrepresentation could influence payment. A reverse false claim concerns knowingly and improperly avoiding an obligation to return government money, rather than fraudulently obtaining it. The separate retaliation claim asks whether Thomas's reports were protected efforts to stop False Claims Act violations. The parties dispute whether his ordinary compliance duties defeat that protection. Proving the employer actually committed fraud is not required for retaliation. Timothy McInnis will seek to revive Thomas's claims and obtain permission to amend, or revise, the complaint. Premier's side is submitted on its written brief, without oral argument.