Show Notes
Cash on the balance sheet and liquidity are different numbers, and the gap is where treasury teams get caught when credit tightens. The position here is blunt: reported cash flatters you, and the panic drawdown of a revolving credit line is a lazy, expensive answer. One mid market manufacturer reported 40 million in cash and equivalents in early 2026 and had about 14 million genuinely spendable, with money trapped behind Brazilian currency controls, parked in a seven day money market fund, and reserved for a covenant test.
You come away able to build a liquidity ladder sorted by days to access, read your MAC clause and leverage triggers before you need the money, add receivables facilities, supply chain finance and private credit lenders alongside relationship banks, and run a 13 week cash forecast that shows the daily low point.
0:00 Why cash is king misleads treasury teams 0:38 40 million on paper, 14 million reachable 1:27 Revolver drawdowns and the MAC clause 2:58 Diversifying beyond two relationship banks 3:33 Forecasting the intramonth trough, not the average 4:11 The one liquidity question to answer tomorrow
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