CLSC Dialogues – Ep 21 – Dan Rice – How Chinese Leaders Conceptualize Protracted War

You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, a China Landpower Studies Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army War College, or any other agency of the U.S. government. I’m Jake Rinaldi, a defense analyst at the China Landpower Studies Center. Jake Rinaldi: In this episode, we’ll be discussing how Chinese leaders conceptualize protracted war. Joining us is Dan Rice, the China political and military subject matter expert at Marine Corps University. He’s also the CEO of the geopolitical analysis firm Foreign Brief and president of Dongfeng LLC, his consulting company. Dan has published on Chinese strategy and the PLA with various think tanks, academic institutions, and U.S. Department of Defense China centers. 00:00:57:18 – 00:01:25:15 Rinaldi: He recently published an article—completely in Chinese—with Taiwan’s National Defense University on countering dual-front threats in the maritime domain. We’ll be talking with Dan about research he presented at the 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA. His paper explored how the concept of protracted war—a war lasting months or years, consuming vast quantities of munitions, equipment, and lives—appears in Chinese publications from party, state, and military institutions. 00:01:25:18 – 00:01:30:00 Rinaldi: Dan, welcome, and thank you for being here. Excited to see this paper published. 00:01:30:02 – 00:01:34:17 Dan Rice Jake, thank you very much for having me. It’s always a pleasure talking with you—really looking forward to this. 00:01:34:19 – 00:01:46:28 Rinaldi: Let’s start with a quick overview of the paper you wrote for our conference. What’s your central argument or the most interesting or surprising conclusion you reached? 00:01:47:00 – 00:02:13:26 Rice: Yeah, absolutely. There’s a lot to unpack, but I think the big takeaway is that the way China officially discusses protracted war is slightly different from how we’ve been approaching it. At the conference, we tried to define what protracted war is and where it fits in our framework. But the way they approach it—across the institutions you mentioned—looks more like a grand strategic framework than a purely military one. 00:02:13:26 – 00:02:54:29 Rice: So instead of viewing it solely as a military concept, they’re incorporating Mao Zedong’s ideas about protracted war into various aspects of grand strategy. It’s a bit of a conceptual tangle at first, but it offers insight into trends we see in the news or broader CCP strategic behavior. 00:02:55:02 – 00:03:22:14 Rice: This is really a whole-of-government, whole-of-civilization type of fight. That was probably the biggest takeaway. And then, of course, we focus a lot on the PLA—you at CLSC and me at MCU. For the PLA specifically, one of the most interesting ideas came from a PLA-affiliated author who discussed not a protracted battle per se, but a protracted process of war—emphasizing preparation, technology development, and gaining small edges in military-adjacent areas to build power. 00:04:24:15 – 00:04:49:06 Rice: Those were some of the more interesting insights. Personally, I learned a lot from the research and appreciate CLSC for the opportunity to be part of the conference and dig into this topic. 00:04:49:08 – 00:05:12:27 Rinaldi: Absolutely—a really interesting and well-written paper. Your use of the term "military tangential" really highlights a core theme: the idea of protracted war often appears in economic or national policy discussions rather than strictly military ones. 00:05:12:28 – 00:05:38:13 Rinaldi: You did find some PLA Daily articles and other military writings, but why do you think the Chinese shy away from discussing protracted war in a military context? Does it reflect confidence in their ability to win a quick, decisive war—or is it more about political constraints on media and scholarship? 00:05:38:15 – 00:05:42:18 Rinaldi: That seems like a rea