Finding SaaS Product-Market Fit After 3 Years of Failed Ideas

He walked into his first pricing call asking for $100,000 and walked out with $10,000 a year. Shahar Azulay had never sold anything before co-founding groundcover, and the product he was selling had no user interface yet, just a sensor and some dashboards. He took it anyway, and still argues that was the right call.

He closed most of the deals himself. It took him ten years to stop. Ross Andrew Paquette bootstrapped Maropost to around $50 million in ARR, and for most of that run he was the discovery call, the demo and the follow-up. It worked well enough to take the business from $300,000 to $27 million in 28 months with six or seven people. Then the thing that built the company became the thing capping it.

He never bought a keyword, never ran content marketing, and the big outbound sales force he tried did not work. Rodney Robinson still grew TabaPay to $100 million in revenue, almost entirely through inbound, on a single $2.5 million seed round that stayed the company's only outside money for nine years.

He needed a big retailer's data to build the product. No big retailer gives data to a company with no product. Felix Hoffmann solved it sideways: 7Learnings sold a paid consulting project, kept the right to use the data, and built its predictive pricing product on top of it. Ten customers later it was at $1M ARR, and he had closed every one himself. Felix explains why a demand forecasting product cannot start with a small customer, how he structured the first pilot as an A/B test so a retailer could hand over half its prices without betting the business, and what happened when the first run came back far too expensive. Plus: how a pricing optimization company prices itself, and why he refuses success-based fees even though he can prove the uplift. 7Learnings is a Berlin company whose software forecasts demand for each product at each price, then sets the price that hits a retailer's goal. It is now at multiple seven figures in ARR with around 40 customers. Felix spent six years as a pricing consultant at Kearney and two years running price optimization at Zalando before founding it. This episode is brought to you by: 🤖 Hobbes → Don't book a demo. Take one. 🔑 Key Lessons 🎯 Solve the data cold start by selling something else first: 7Learnings could not train a forecasting model without a large retailer's sales history, so it sold a paid consulting project and kept the right to use that dataset. 🤝 Shrink a scary ask into a reversible test: Retailers would not hand pricing to an algorithm outright, so 7Learnings ran an A/B test on half the assortment while the retailer's own team priced the rest. 📉 Pick an early customer who can survive a failure: The first live pricing run was badly wrong on high-priced products. It survived because the buyer had a big enough problem, no alternative, and understood they were working with a startup. 💰 Price high enough to lose some deals: His test is blunt. If nobody is walking away because you are too expensive, you are too cheap, especially for a complex product carrying real delivery cost. 🚀 Founder-led sales lasts longer than founders expect: Felix closed all ten customers behind the first $1M ARR himself, and stayed closely involved through the next forty, because handing off enterprise sales is genuinely hard. ⚡ Pick the technology after the problem, not before: Felix argues founders are all digging in the same technical space, and that decisions needing determinism, low cost and explainability should not be handed to an LLM. Chapters Where the idea came from: Kearney, then Zalando The hardest part was finding co-founders The consulting project that funded the product Finding the first paying customer Structuring the first deal as an A/B test The first upload was a disaster How a pricing company prices itself Ten customers to $1M ARR The price matching objection Why LLMs don't belong in the pricing decision Resources Full show notes: https://saasclub.io/494 Join 5,000+ SaaS founders: https://saasclub.io/email

Nine months in. Close to zero customers. He was ready to hand the money back to investors. Rick Knudtson had already sold one company, so Workshop started with the idea he found interesting: an intranet. Customers kept telling him to fix email instead. The rebuild took 30 days and brought in 10 customers. Rick explains why big enterprises cannot run internal comms on a cheap marketing tool, how a year of newsletters and ungated resources filled the pipeline before Workshop had anything to sell, and what changed when the founding team stopped defending its own idea and started listening to customers. Plus: why Workshop dropped per-user fees for audience-based pricing, and how that changed the way customers expand into new departments. Workshop is an internal communications software platform based in Omaha with around 140 employees and just under 1,000 customers, including Capgemini. It is five years old and past $10M ARR. Rick previously co-founded Flywheel, a WordPress hosting platform sold to WP Engine in 2019. This episode is brought to you by: 🤖 Hobbes → Don't book a demo. Take one. 🔑 Key Lessons 👂 The signal was in the sales calls all along: Prospects named email as their biggest internal comms pain for nine months while Workshop kept building an intranet. Listening to customers only started once the ego from a previous exit got out of the way. 🎯 Finding product-market fit was obvious when it finally arrived: Nine months of selling the intranet earned about three customers. Thirty days on the email product brought ten. That gap told the team exactly where to go all in. 🧱 Pick a first problem you can ship fast: An intranet cannot be built iteratively, so feedback loops stall for months. Email analytics was small enough to ship in 30 days and grow into a wider platform. 🔒 Enterprise email is not a MailChimp problem: Security layers, IT governance, and getting a message into 100,000 inboxes in minutes are why large companies cannot run internal comms on an off-the-shelf marketing tool. 📣 Market for a year before you sell anything: Workshop launched a weekly newsletter on day one, now at 50,000 subscribers, alongside ungated resources and monthly webinars that grew from five attendees to five hundred. 💰 Audience-based pricing removes expansion friction: Workshop charges by employee audience size and by channel rather than per seat, so adding another department never triggers a procurement review or a new negotiation. 🧭 Write the mission first and the values later: A broad mission gave the team direction before the product existed. Values waited twelve months so they described what had actually kept the company alive. Chapters How selling Flywheel led to the internal comms idea Writing the mission statement before the product The intranet bet and why it never found a through line Why enterprise email is harder than founders assume Building a newsletter and resource library before selling Nine months, near-zero customers, and the plan to return the money The bar conversation that led to the 30-day email rebuild Ten customers in 30 days and what product-market fit felt like Audience-based pricing and dropping per-seat fees Lightning round Resources Full show notes: https://saasclub.io/493 Join 5,000+ SaaS founders: https://saasclub.io/email