
Show Notes
The Sixth Circuit hears a challenge to the dismissal of a taxpayer's innocent-spouse case. Those provisions can relieve a person of some tax liability arising from a joint return. Her Tax Court petition was filed after the ninety-day deadline. The Tax Court raised timeliness on its own and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It also concluded that she had not justified an exception to the deadline. Jurisdiction is a court's legal power to hear a case. A jurisdictional deadline cannot be excused through equitable tolling. When available, that doctrine permits narrow relief from lateness unavoidably caused by circumstances beyond a litigant's control. But calling a deadline nonjurisdictional does not automatically excuse missing it. The taxpayer will argue that Congress did not clearly make timely filing a condition of the court's power, and will seek further proceedings in the Tax Court. The government will defend the jurisdictional dismissal and the Tax Court's alternative ruling on the excuse for lateness. The judges must separate the court's power, the availability of tolling, and whether the particular facts justify it.
Borrillo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 25-1748) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, argued October 22, 2026.
Sources:
Argument audio — official Sixth Circuit recording: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/audio/10-22-2026%20-%20Thursday/25-1748%20Christine%20Borrillo%20v%20CIR.mp3
Official court recordings listing: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.php
Case and argument date — official calendar, physical PDF page 20: https://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/oral_argument_calendars/10192026_arg.pdf
Tax Court case 14170-24 — docket entries 11 and 18; May 30, 2025 dismissal order: https://dawson.ustaxcourt.gov/case-detail/14170-24
Innocent-spouse relief and Tax Court deadline — 26 U.S.C. 6015(a), (e) and (f): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6015
Types of spouse relief — official IRS explanation: https://www.irs.gov/individuals/innocent-spouse-relief
Jurisdiction versus equitable tolling — Boechler, Supreme Court majority: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1472_6j37.pdf
Sixth Circuit deadline and tolling principles — Oquendo, pages 11 and 15–16: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0237p-06.pdf
More from Oral Arguments, with Context
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