Show Notes
En 2015, l’appelant est accusé du meurtre au deuxième degré de sa conjointe. Avant son procès, une juge de la Cour supérieure du Québec accueille sa requête pour que son procès se déroule devant juge seul, suivant le par. 473(1) du Code criminel, en dépit de l’absence de consentement de l’intimé poursuivant. La juge est d’avis que la décision du poursuivant de consentir à un procès devant juge seul n’est pas au cœur de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, mais qu’il s’agit plutôt d’une décision stratégique, soumise au pouvoir de la cour de contrôler sa procédure. En tenant compte des particularités du cas d’espèce, la juge est d’avis que l’accusé s’est déchargé de son fardeau de démontrer que la décision du poursuivant est déraisonnable ou inéquitable dans les circonstances. Au terme d’un procès sans jury, l’accusé est acquitté de meurtre au deuxième degré, mais déclaré coupable d’homicide involontaire coupable.
La Cour d’appel accueille l’appel de l’intimé poursuivant et ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès sur l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré devant un jury. La cour est d’avis que la juge de première instance a erré en appliquant la norme de la décision déraisonnable afin de réviser le refus de consentement du poursuivant alors que l’accusé avait à prouver que ce refus constituait un abus de procédure. La cour conclut que l’accusé échoue à faire cette démonstration et que le jugement contesté est donc vicié par une erreur de droit qui a eu pour effet d’accorder au tribunal une compétence qu’il n’avait pas. Le procès de l’accusé est donc nul.
More from Canada's Court: Oral Arguments from the SCC
R.B.-C. was convicted of sexual assault. He is an Iranian citizen living in Canada on a post-graduation work permit. But his sentence was not imposed until more than 14 months after his conviction. When it finally was imposed, he received a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by probation.
Mr. Cope plead guilty to the aggravated assault of his common law partner. He had a significant criminal record, and a significant history of mental illness. Both he and his partner are Indigenous. The sentencing judge sentenced him to 5 years in custody for the aggravated assault, and eight months of custody for breaching the release orders he was subject to at the time of the aggravated assault on his partner.
The respondent was charged with multiple counts of sexual offences in relation to three separate complainants, and in addition was charged with one count of simple assault. At trial, he was found guilty of the assault, but acquitted of the sexual offences. The trial judge found there was reasonable doubt on whether the acts were for a sexual purpose, and whether there was an exploitative relationship between the parties. The Crown appealed two of the sexual offence counts, arguing that the trial judge erred in excluding images found on a USB of other women, who were mostly clothed or partially clothed, in relation to a sexual fantasy involving magic acts and sawing women in half. The Crown sought to introduce this evidence as a similar fact application per Handy, while the defence argued it was bad character evidence and would result in propensity reasoning. The respondent had asked the complainants if he could use his cardboard saw to pretend to cut them in half, or place it on their abdomen to take a photo.
The two respondents, jointly tried for a number of drug trafficking and related charges, argued that the delay in their case was unreasonable. While both the Crown and Defence agreed at trial that the delay was over the 18-month presumptive Jordan ceiling, the Crown sought to justify the delay by arguing that the complexity of the case necessitated the delay. The trial judge disagreed and stayed the charges. The trial judge found that the delay in the case was not justified as exceptional because of any complexity.
Despite the fact that the trial judge found that the appellant sent sexually explicit material to a minor, the trial judge was left in doubt as to whether (a) the identity of the appellant was made out on the video as an element of the offence, and (b) the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated offences, reasoning that it could have been simply a case of “flirtation”. The appellant was acquitted at trial of transmitting sexually explicit material to a person under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of either a sexual assault or the indecent act of exposing his genital organs to a person under 16 years of age for a sexual purpose.