Oral Argument Re-Listen: Sripetch v. SEC | Victimless Fraudsters Can't Keep Profits
The High Court ReportShow Notes
Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026 Overview: The Supreme Court resolves a circuit split over whether the SEC must prove investors lost money before ordering disgorgement — preserving billions in annual securities enforcement power. Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm. Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split. Main Arguments: Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties. SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.
Holding: The SEC may obtain a disgorgement award without proving investors suffered pecuniary loss. Traditional equitable principles tie the remedy to the defendant's wrongful gain from invading legally protected interests — not to any documented financial loss by the victim. Ninth Circuit affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Ninth Circuit affirmed. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity; (2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss; (3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.
Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.
Implications: (1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money; (2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement; (3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.
The Fine Print: 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."
Primary Cases: Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended. SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit require
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Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 27, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: Federal pesticide law blocks a Missouri cancer patient's failure-to-warn lawsuit against Monsanto after the EPA repeatedly approved Roundup's label without requiring a cancer warning, despite the patient's claims linking Roundup to his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Question Presented: Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim seeking a cancer warning the EPA declined to require. Posture: Missouri jury awarded Durnell $1.25M; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Main Arguments: • Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's registration and label approval without a cancer warning creates a binding federal requirement that preempts stricter state demands; (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval processes create preemptive federal requirements; (3) Missouri's failure-to-warn verdict retroactively penalizes Monsanto for complying with the federal label EPA mandated. • Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's specific label approval — sets the operative federal labeling requirement, and Missouri's tort mirrors it exactly; (2) FIFRA § 136a(f)(2) bars treating registration as a complete defense, stripping EPA approval of conclusive force; (3) Manufacturers can add a cancer warning through amended registration or minor modification, defeating impossibility preemption. Holding: FIFRA's preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly preempts Durnell's state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup's label in addition to or different from the label required under FIFRA. Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: • (1) FIFRA's registration process mandates substantive EPA label review; after approval, manufacturers must use that label and cannot change it without prior agency authorization; • (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval creates binding federal "requirements" — EPA pesticide registration functions identically and carries the same preemptive force; • (3) Durnell's claim imposes a labeling requirement "in addition to or different from" the EPA-approved label, triggering FIFRA's express preemption clause and its mandate for nationwide uniformity. Separate Opinions: • Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority fully; wrote separately to flag three constitutional concerns: FIFRA may exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority, violate the non-delegation doctrine, and rely on a form of agency preemption the Supremacy Clause may not support. • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Gorsuch): FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's label approval — constitutes the operative federal requirement. Missouri's failure-to-warn tort mirrors that prohibition, imposing nothing "in addition to or different from" federal law; § 136a(f)(2) confirms registration carries no preemptive force. Implications: • (1) State-law failure-to-warn claims against federally registered pesticides face preemption nationwide, closing state courtrooms to injured consumers seeking damages; • (2) Plaintiffs must petition the EPA directly, then seek judicial review of agency decisions, rather than pursue state tort remedies — a longer, harder road with no individual damages award; • (3) Manufacturers across food, drug, medical device, and consumer product industries gain stronger preemption defenses under analogous federal labeling statutes. The Fine Print: • FIFRA § 136v(b) — "Uniformity": "A State shall not impose or
Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe, et al. | No. 25-1083 (consolidated with Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot, et al., No. 25-1084) | Docket: Here | Argued: April 29, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: The TPS statute strips federal courts of all power to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's mandatory procedures when terminating Temporary Protected Status, cutting off legal relief for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from thirteen countries. Question Presented: Whether the TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all court challenges — including claims the Secretary violated mandatory statutory procedures — when terminating TPS designations for Syria and Haiti. Posture: District courts granted emergency relief; appellate courts declined stays; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment. Main Arguments: • Government (Petitioner): (1) "Determination" in § 1254a(b)(5)(A) covers every step in the TPS termination process — both the final decision and all procedures leading to it — barring all non-constitutional challenges; (2) the Secretary satisfied the consultation requirement by seeking State Department input before each termination; (3) terminating all thirteen TPS countries across racially diverse nations defeats any inference of racial animus against Haiti. • TPS Holders (Respondent): (1) "Determination" covers only the Secretary's factual conclusion about country conditions, not the mandatory procedural steps Congress wrote specifically to constrain executive discretion; (2) the Secretary never consulted agencies about country conditions — the State Department email addressed "foreign policy concerns," not safety; (3) presidential statements about Haitians combined with the across-the-board termination pattern demonstrate racial animus as a motivating factor. Holding: The TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all non-constitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions, including claims the Secretary failed to follow mandatory procedural requirements; the Haitian TPS holders failed to demonstrate racial animus likely motivated Haiti's termination, making preliminary relief unavailable on their equal protection claim; both District Court orders reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion (all parts except Part III-A) joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett; Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh also joined Part III-A, making that section a four-Justice plurality only. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: • (1) "Determination" — under any ordinary meaning, individual decision or entire process leading to one — covers all non-constitutional TPS challenges, including procedural claims; (2) "with respect to" further broadens the bar to cover everything relating to the termination, citing Patel v. Garland (2022); (3) respondents' own argument that the Secretary terminated all thirteen racially diverse TPS countries supplies the race-neutral explanation defeating the equal protection claim. Separate Opinions: • Justice Thomas (Concurring): Joined the majority in full; argued the judicial review bar also eliminates constitutional claims; further argued that aliens hold no equal protection rights against the federal government because Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) was wrongly decided. (35 words) • Justice Kagan (Dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson): Argued "determination" refers only to the Secretary's country-conditions conclusions, not mandatory procedural steps preceding them; the State Department email exchange never constituted real consultation; and racial animus tainted Haiti's termination under Arlington Heights. (37 words) Implications: • (1) Federal courts lose all power to enforce TPS mandatory procedures, leaving statutory compliance
OVERVIEW Three opinions released June 30th, 2026 — the final day of the October 2025 Term — spanning birthright citizenship, transgender athletes in school sports, and political party campaign spending. Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, anchored by Kavanaugh — in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Title IX and equal protection) and NRSC v. FEC (First Amendment). A third split 5-4 in Trump v. Barbara, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett crossing coalitions to strike down the President's birthright citizenship order alongside the Court's three liberal justices. Justice Kavanaugh authored two majorities and a pivotal concurrence-in-judgment-and-dissent-in-part in the third — the day's most prolific author. Justice Gorsuch filed three separate writings across two cases — two dissents in Barbara (one joining Thomas, one solo) plus a concurrence in B.P.J. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in Barbara and a concurrence in B.P.J. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all three cases, splitting only in B.P.J. where Sotomayor and Jackson each filed separate partial dissents. Trump v. Barbara spans 194 pages — 30 more than another blockbuster this Term, the Trump Tariff Cases. Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Argued: 04/01/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026 Overview: President Trump's executive order strips birthright citizenship from children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents, triggering a constitutional fight over the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause. Question Presented: Whether the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to children born here to unlawfully or temporarily present parents. Posture: District Court enjoined the order; Supreme Court granted cert before judgment. Holding: Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present still fall "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus qualify as citizens at birth under the Citizenship Clause. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Sotomayor as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a separate dissenting opinion. Affirmed. Majority Reasoning: (1) English common law granted citizenship by birth regardless of parents' momentary presence; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark (1898) codify that rule, rejecting Dred Scott; (3) Historical record shows scant evidence Congress intended a domicile requirement. Separate Opinions: Justice Jackson (concurring): Rebuts Thomas's narrower reading, framing the Amendment as a broad anticaste reset rather than a remedy solely for formerly enslaved people. Justice Kavanaugh (concurring in judgment, dissenting in part): Order violates a federal statute, not the Constitution; Congress could legislate new exceptions but hasn't. Justice Thomas (dissenting): Citizenship requires actual domicile, not mere birth; Amendment protected only those with "no other homeland." Justice Alito (dissenting): Citizenship requires sole allegiance; majority's rule extends citizenship to children of "birth tourists." Justice Gorsuch (dissenting): Advances a distinct "settler's view" tying citizenship to parents making America their permanent home.
Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Al Otro Lado, et al. | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5.html | Argued: March 24, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: Border-access challenge determining whether federal immigration law requires officers to inspect and process asylum seekers at ports of entry before they cross into U.S. territory, or whether statutory duties attach only upon physical territorial entry. Question Presented: Whether noncitizens blocked at the border before physically crossing "arrive in the United States," triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing duties under federal immigration law. Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; district court declared metering policy unlawful; Supreme Court reversed. Main Arguments: Government (Petitioner): (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — physical territorial entry; a running back stopped at the 1-yard line has not arrived in the end zone; (2) INA inspection and removal procedures presuppose U.S. presence — officers cannot enforce them against people standing in Mexico; (3) Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and the presumption against extraterritoriality confirm statutory duties apply only inside U.S. territory. Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports — otherwise the clause wholly duplicates "physically present," violating the surplusage canon; (2) Congress enacted §§1158 and 1225 to implement non-refoulement obligations barring return of refugees to persecution; (3) Federal regulations for 30 years defined "arriving alien" as anyone "attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry."
OVERVIEW Four opinions released June 29th, 2026 — one day, across digital privacy, presidential removal power at two federal agencies, and absentee ballot receipt deadlines. Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, the same liberal dissent — in Chatrie (Fourth Amendment) and Slaughter (FTC removal). A third split 5-4 in Cook, with Roberts crossing coalitions to block the President's removal of a Federal Reserve governor. A fourth, Watson, drew Barrett alongside Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson to protect state absentee-ballot rules. Chief Justice Roberts authored two majorities — opposite outcomes in two "Trump v." cases on the same day. Justice Alito dissented three times, authoring a majority only in Slaughter. Justice Gorsuch filed concurrences in two cases — challenging Katz in Chatrie, warning of executive power consolidation in Slaughter. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all four. The Court plans to release opinions tomorrow, June 30th — likely the final batch of the October 2025 Term.