Show Notes
In this episode, Trish Kerin and Traci Purdum discuss process safety insights with Alex Fernando and Warren Smith from Incident Analytics. Their research analyzed over 10,000 incidents across 12 countries and multiple high-risk industries. Key findings include that organizations often misclassify serious incidents, missing critical learning opportunities. Many safety controls are "difficult" or "unworkable" in practice, with workers adapting procedures to get jobs done despite inadequate equipment or impractical requirements. The research reveals a significant gap between "work as imagined" and "work as done." A fundamental shift in leadership thinking needs to take place — from asking "why didn't they follow the procedure?" to "why couldn't they follow the procedure?" References: Whitepaper 1 Whitepaper 2
More from Process Safety with Trish & Traci
AI agents are now so easy to build that almost anyone can create one, but easy access doesn't mean blanket permission. In this episode, Trish and Traci explore how agentic and generative AI can help chemical facilities by gathering data for risk assessments, spotting weak signals in process trends and freeing engineers from administrative work. They also cover the risks: hallucinated sources, rogue agents and company information leaking into public tools. Trish urges listeners to fix broken processes before automating them, keep risk assessments human-led and verify every output. The goal isn't to fear AI but to use it thoughtfully.
Our brains are wired to find meaning in incomplete information — even when there isn't any. Here's how that same shortcut that turns clouds into animals can turn ambiguous data into costly decisions, and the simple question that can snap you out of autopilot.
With federal OSHA down to roughly 1,700 inspectors for 12 million workplaces — meaning a facility might see a full inspection once every 191 years — self-regulation has effectively become the entire safety system. In this episode, Trish Kerin explains why internal teams stop noticing their own drift from procedure (normalization of deviance) and why "no incidents" doesn't mean a program is working — only that controls haven't been tested yet. She outlines practical fixes: cold-eyes audits between facilities, the three lines of defense model, and the crucial difference between assurance and reassurance. Her bottom line: good process safety isn't just compliance — it drives reliability, productivity and profit.
On this episode of Processing Safety with Trish and Traci, forensic engineer Dr. Sean Brady joins Trish Kerin and Traci Purdum to revisit Piper Alpha, the 1988 North Sea platform disaster that killed 167 workers. They trace how a lost permit-to-work, a missing relief valve, and a design never updated for gas service combined with failed firewalls, redundant systems that bred false confidence and risers that kept feeding the fire. Using the "Jenga tower" metaphor, Brady explains how safety systems degrade unnoticed until they collapse, and why organizations must dispense with likelihood and focus on consequence, controls, and leadership culture to prevent the next catastrophe.
Smart design and layout choices, made well before a crisis hits, can protect plants from cyberattacks, sabotage and extreme weather without a major capital investment. This is based on an article from Amin Almasi, "Disaster Planning in Process Plants: Best Offense is a Passive Defense," Chemical Processing, July 20, 2026