Margules v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company — 2d Cir. (Oct 23, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit hears a dispute over federal dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Salmon and steelhead must pass the dams and reservoirs on their migrations between spawning grounds and the Pacific Ocean. The same river system supplies electricity, irrigation water and routes for commercial vessels. How the dams release and hold water can affect all of those uses. The National Wildlife Federation and other conservation groups, joined by Oregon, challenged the government's twenty-twenty operating plan. The fisheries agency concluded that the plan was not likely to jeopardize protected species. The challengers say its analysis understates the harm. Negotiations paused the lawsuit, but it resumed after the federal government withdrew from a twenty-twenty-three agreement. The district judge then ordered temporary changes at eight dams, including more spill and limits on reservoir levels. Spill means releasing water through a spillway rather than through the power-producing turbines. It can provide a passage route for young fish traveling downstream. But the parties disagree over how much spill helps, its effects on adult fish moving upstream, and the risks to electricity supplies and navigation. This appeal concerns a preliminary injunction: protection while the lawsuit proceeds, not a final judgment resolving the case. Section seven of the Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies to ensure their actions are not likely to jeopardize protected species. A biological opinion, often called a BiOp, is the consulting agency's assessment of those effects. Here the judges will examine whether the fisheries agency used a lawful analysis and how much deference its scientific judgments deserve. They must also decide whether the district court had authority to hear this challenge at all. Jacob Ecker will argue for the United States that the judge displaced the agencies' expertise and imposed harmful operating requirements. Amanda Goodin, for the challengers, will defend the temporary protections and contend that the agencies repeated legal errors already rejected in this litigation.

The Sixth Circuit hears Jonathan Sellars' appeal from the dismissal of his excessive-force lawsuit. His family sought help during a mental-health crisis at his Tennessee home. Officers tried to take him to a hospital, he resisted, and a deputy punched him in the face during the encounter. Sellars sued the deputy and Sumner County. He later pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and assaulting a first responder. The district court concluded that his resisting-arrest conviction prevented the federal civil claim from going forward. The lawsuit uses Section nineteen eighty-three, a federal law allowing people to seek redress for violations of federal rights by officials acting under state authority. But Heck versus Humphrey imposes a limit: a civil damages claim cannot proceed if winning would necessarily undermine a still-valid criminal conviction. The important word is necessarily. Admitting resistance does not automatically answer every question about the amount of force an officer may use. Tennessee law makes the distinction important. An unlawful arrest alone is generally not a defense to resisting arrest. A separate self-defense provision has two requirements: the officer uses more force than necessary, and the person reasonably believes resistance is immediately necessary to protect against that force. An affirmative defense is a legal justification that can excuse conduct otherwise treated as criminal. The dispute is whether success on this civil claim would necessarily establish both requirements. Bryan Moseley will argue for Sellars that his resistance was not self-defense against the punch, so the conviction and civil claim can coexist. Tom Russell, for the deputy and county, will argue that the force and resistance were one inseparable struggle and that the guilty plea bars the suit. Listen also for the judges' questions about whether Sellars adequately presented his argument in his opening appeal brief. Allowing the case to proceed would not itself decide whether the punch was unlawful.

The Sixth Circuit considers a lawsuit over the fatal shooting of Gary Bressler outside his Kentucky home. Bressler called nine one one asking for police to come to the house. He was carrying a sword when two state troopers arrived. Both troopers fired, and he died. His wife, Heather, and the officers gave conflicting accounts of his movements and the danger he posed. The family sued, alleging excessive force. A jury returned a verdict for the troopers. Heather Bressler now seeks a new trial, challenging the legal directions given to that jury. Michael O'Hara will argue for the family that the instructions left out a necessary limit on deadly force. The troopers' lawyer will defend the instructions and the verdict. This is a civil damages case, not a criminal prosecution of the officers. The appeal asks whether the jury was given the right legal test, not simply which account of the shooting the appellate judges believe. The governing framework is the Fourth Amendment's rule against unreasonable seizures. In Graham versus Connor, the Supreme Court explained that police force is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer facing those circumstances, rather than with hindsight. Factors include the seriousness of the suspected crime, an immediate safety threat, and resistance or flight. The family's lawyer will rely on Tennessee versus Garner to argue that a shooting requires an explicit finding of probable cause to believe there was a significant threat of death or serious injury. The troopers will counter that reasonableness depends on all the circumstances, not a rigid checklist, invoking Scott versus Harris. Listen for the distinction between considering a threat as one factor and requiring it as a minimum condition before deadly force is lawful.

The Sixth Circuit hears Gerald Cook Junior's challenge to a warrant used to search an Ohio home. Police arranged two drug purchases through a confidential informant and relied on those purchases as part of their justification for the search. Cook disputes the informant's identification and officers' claimed observations of him leaving the back of the house. The case led to federal drug and firearms charges; this appeal concerns his challenge to that residential search. A motion to suppress asks a court to exclude evidence from the prosecution's case. An earlier lawyer withdrew Cook's search challenge. A new lawyer later filed another motion. Cook will contend that this was a timely, fresh challenge, not an attempt to reopen a matter already decided. The government will defend the denial and argue that he failed to make the showing needed for a hearing on his allegations. That hearing is called a Franks hearing, after the Supreme Court case Franks versus Delaware. It concerns the truthfulness of the officer's affidavit, the sworn written account supporting the warrant. To obtain a hearing, the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the officer deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement needed to establish probable cause. Innocent mistakes or a mere desire to question witnesses are not enough. Qualifying for a hearing is not the same as winning suppression. You will hear the judges ask what happens if Cook wins his factual objections. Excising a statement means setting it aside. If the remaining affidavit still justifies searching the home, the alleged falsehood would not invalidate the warrant. The central question is whether the remaining facts sufficiently connect the drug activity to the house, even without the disputed identification and observations.

The Second Circuit hears a dispute over unpaid goods and a personal guaranty. Phoenix Fashion says businesses associated with Jack Saadia failed to pay for goods they ordered, and that he personally guaranteed their payment obligations. The district court entered a multimillion-dollar default judgment. Saadia wants that judgment undone so he can defend the case. The procedural history matters. The defendants had answered an earlier complaint, but did not answer the amended complaint. Saadia maintains that the missed response resulted from a misunderstanding. The judge found that this default was not willful, but also found that repeated delays had harmed Phoenix Fashion and that there was no meritorious defense to most of the claimed damages. The judge offered to set aside the default if the defendants posted a bond of more than three million dollars. They did not post it, and judgment followed. Two stages must be kept separate. Under Rule fifty-five, an entry of default records a failure to defend. A default judgment is the later decision granting relief. Setting aside the first is not the same request as opposing the second. Default does not relieve the plaintiff of substantiating its damages. An inquest, a term you will hear, means a hearing to determine damages in this setting; it is not a criminal investigation. Saadia will challenge the bond condition and insist that he had defenses involving deliveries, cancelled orders and credits. Phoenix Fashion will defend the judgment, pointing to repeated missed steps and the failure to post the bond. The judges will also ask what objections were actually presented before judgment. This is appellate review of those rulings, not a new trial over each invoice.