John Doe v. IRS, et al. — 6th Cir. (Oct 21, 2026)

A Veterans Affairs executive seeks relief from a firing that a court already found procedurally defective. James Trinka held a career Senior Executive Service position at the department. The VA accused him of giving false information to internal investigators and removed him in 2020. He challenges the procedures used to take away his job. In 2023, a federal district court found three problems: the agency had not given Trinka a recording of his interview, had been unclear about the standard of proof, and had improperly relied on conduct predating a 2017 statutory change. The judge sent the matter back to the VA without restoring Trinka to his position. In 2024, the VA provided the recording, explicitly applied a more-likely-than-not standard, and again upheld his removal. In July 2025, the district court accepted that amendment and ruled for the government. Trinka now asks what relief follows from the original defective firing, including the possibility of back pay for the intervening years. Remand without vacatur means sending a decision back to an agency while leaving it in place. Vacatur would set it aside. Section Seven Thirteen of Title Thirty-Eight says a reviewing court may set aside unlawful VA employment actions. The lawyers disagree about how much choice that wording leaves a judge after a due process violation. Vitarelli versus Seaton is a 1959 Supreme Court case in which an employee's dismissal was held ineffective because the department failed to follow its own procedural rules. The lawyers will debate what that decision requires here. They will also discuss harmless error: whether a procedural mistake made a legally relevant difference, not whether losing years of pay was painless. Elizabeth Clarke will argue first for Trinka. She will contend that process provided years after removal cannot retroactively erase the original violation. David Peters will represent the government, arguing that the court properly allowed the agency to fix its procedures and that reinstatement is not automatic.

The 2002 killing of Jam Master Jay returns to court, but this appeal is not simply about who fired the gun. Jason Mizell, the hip-hop deejay, was shot in his Queens recording studio. His godson Karl Jordan and longtime friend Ronald Washington were tried together. The prosecution connected the killing to a proposed cocaine operation in Baltimore and Washington's exclusion from that deal. A jury convicted both men of drug-related and firearm-related murder in 2024. In December 2025, Judge Hall set aside Jordan's two convictions for insufficient evidence. The government now asks the Second Circuit to reinstate the jury's verdict. This is the merits appeal, not the earlier hearing on Jordan's bail. The acquittal was not a ruling that no reasonable jury could identify Jordan as the shooter. Hall found evidence of his participation in a drug conspiracy, but not enough connecting his involvement in the killing to the drug operation. That distinction is central. Under Rule Twenty-Nine, a judge may set aside a guilty verdict when the evidence cannot support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. This tests legal sufficiency, not which witnesses the judge prefers. The court must credit reasonable inferences favoring the prosecution, but cannot fill a missing element with speculation. Section Eight Forty-Eight requires a substantive connection between the intentional killing and qualifying drug activity. A drug-related motive can supply that connection; it need not be the only motive. The companion firearm charge also requires a link to the underlying drug crime. Using a gun in a killing does not, by itself, prove that link. Miranda Gonzalez, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York, will argue first for the government. She will rely on the timing, Jordan's relationship with Washington, and the coordinated killing. She will also invoke aiding and abetting: responsibility for intentionally helping another person commit a crime. John Diaz will defend the acquittal, arguing that the government has not proved Jordan knew or shared Washington's drug-related purpose. Listen for the line between a reasonable inference and a speculative leap.

A nineteen-eighty-three California murder case reaches federal court over what a state jury already decided. Marsha Carter was killed with a knife. DNA testing years later helped bring Smothers to trial. In 2018, jurors convicted him of murder but rejected a separate allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon. The California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction in 2021 because his lawyer failed to present the identity of another man whose DNA was found beneath Carter's fingernails. The court found that omission prejudicial. But the reversal was not an acquittal of murder. The court expressly left open a new trial on a conspiracy theory: an agreement with another person to commit the killing. California now seeks to retry him. The weapon allegation was a sentencing enhancement, an additional finding that could increase punishment. Smothers will argue that rejecting it bars the state from presenting him as the actual killer in the new trial. California will respond that weapon use is a separate issue from murder liability, which may rest on more than one theory of responsibility. This raises collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion: a fact necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor by a final judgment cannot be relitigated between the same parties. The difficult question is what the first verdict necessarily resolved here, not simply which interpretation seems most likely. Smothers has sought federal habeas corpus relief, a procedure for challenging unlawful custody, before the state's retrial. Younger abstention normally limits federal interference with ongoing state prosecutions. Smothers argues that his double jeopardy claim fits an exception. The appeal also requires a certificate of appealability, or C.O.A., based on a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. An earlier panel granted one. The judges will now ask whether its wording covers what needs to be decided, and whether it should be changed or withdrawn. Michael Burt will argue first for Smothers.

A drumbeat heard in Mary J. Blige's Real Love brings a music publisher into a copyright lawsuit. TufAmerica, also known as Tuff City Records, owns rights to Impeach the President, recorded by the Honey Drippers in 1973. It alleges that Audio Two sampled that song in Top Billin', and that Real Love, released in 1992, copied those drum sounds and their underlying musical elements through Top Billin'. The distinction between a recording and a composition matters. A sound-recording copyright protects recorded sounds; a composition copyright protects the underlying musical work. This lawsuit concerns the composition. TufAmerica contends that the publisher needed a license of its own. The publisher will answer that copying sounds does not, by itself, establish unlawful copying of protected musical expression. In September 2025, Judge Dale Ho dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning TufAmerica could not simply amend its complaint and continue. He found that the songs were not substantially similar and that amendment would be futile. This was a ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule Twelve, not a jury verdict. The appeal asks whether that early dismissal was proper. Listen for the difference between comparing the songs' overall impression and examining a copied fragment. Fragmented literal similarity concerns exact or nearly exact copying of part of a work. The question includes both how much was taken and how important it was to the earlier work. A short sample is not automatically lawful or unlawful. The lawyers will also debate whether TufAmerica preserved its arguments below. Hillel Parness of Parness Law Firm will argue for TufAmerica. He will seek a closer examination of the repeating drum pattern and an opportunity to develop the case. Joelle Milov will defend the publisher, Songs of Universal. She will argue that the songs themselves establish the lack of substantial similarity, and that the complaint did not adequately support a different analysis. The court's original recording cuts off during the judge's administrative closing, after both lawyers have finished. That gap is preserved, not reconstructed.

Roger Rogoff was sworn in as the top federal prosecutor for western Washington, then told less than an hour later that President Trump had removed him. The federal judges in that district, rather than the President, had appointed him on July 15, 2026. Rogoff sued to challenge the firing. U.S. attorneys ordinarily take office through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. But federal law supplies a fallback when an office remains vacant. Under Section 546, the Attorney General may make an interim appointment lasting up to 120 days. If that period expires, the district court may appoint a U.S. attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. That was the route used for Rogoff. On October 1, a district judge issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to recognize him as U.S. attorney and not obstruct his work. A preliminary injunction provides temporary protection while litigation continues, based in part on whether the person seeking it is likely to win. This appeal challenges that order, not a final trial judgment. The government will rely on another provision, Section 541, which makes each U.S. attorney subject to removal by the President. It will argue that this includes court appointees. Rogoff will argue that the special court-appointment provision protects his service until the vacancy is filled through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. The dispute also concerns the Constitution's Appointments Clause. It allows Congress to entrust appointment of subordinate federal officers to courts, among other options. The parties agree that courts can make these appointments. They disagree about whether the President must retain power to fire the appointee, and whether the Attorney General's control over prosecutions is enough to preserve executive accountability. The judges will also ask about harm to Rogoff and the public, and who could lawfully run the office if his removal stands. You will hear constitutional avoidance: interpreting a statute, where reasonably possible, to avoid serious constitutional problems. That is not permission to rewrite an otherwise clear law. The government will argue first.