Show Notes
Health benefit funds for retired coal miners and their dependents challenge reductions in their Medicare reimbursement. The plaintiffs are trustees of four United Mine Workers of America plans. This is not a lawsuit over one patient's treatment. It concerns how the federal government reimburses these plans for medical services. Under a longstanding Medicare Part B arrangement, the funds pay physicians for covered care and receive reimbursement from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS, based on reasonable costs. Advance payments are reconciled through an annual cost report. That payment chain matters because the funds and the government disagree about where a federal budget cut belongs. The first dispute concerns the two-percent Medicare reduction that began in 2013. You will hear it called sequestration: an automatic reduction in federal spending. The funds reduced their payments to physicians by two percent. CMS then applied a two-percent reduction when calculating the funds' reimbursement. The trustees say that imposes a second cut for the same services and shifts Medicare costs onto money intended for miners' benefits. The government sees two different transactions. It will argue that paying physicians less lowers the funds' actual costs, while the law still requires a reduction in the federal reimbursement calculated from those costs. The judges will examine whether the unusual structure of these plans changes that result. There is also a separate dispute over audits of the funds' 2012 and 2013 cost reports. Contractors found payment errors in samples of claims and extrapolated: they used the samples to estimate overpayments across a larger group. The trustees contend that the statutory conditions for using that method were not met. That is a challenge to the audit method, not a finding that the funds committed fraud. After administrative review, the federal district court upheld the government's treatment of both issues. The trustees now seek reversal in the D.C. Circuit. Ron Connelly will present their appeal.
Micheal Buckner v. Robert Kennedy, Jr. (No. 25-5343) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued October 19, 2026.
Sources:
Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/10/25-5343.mp3
Case, counsel and argument date — official D.C. Circuit archive: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/10
Case background and prior ruling — D.D.C. memorandum opinion, August 1, 2025: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1%3A2023cv03524/262353/33/0.pdf
Appeal identity and originating case — case-linked appellate docket: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cadc/25-5343
Medicare sequestration rules — 2 U.S.C. § 906(d): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/906
Direct-spending reductions and Medicare cap — 2 U.S.C. § 901a(6): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/901a
Sampling and extrapolation limits — 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1395ddd
Health care prepayment plans — 42 C.F.R. § 417.800: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/417.800
Annual cost reports and final settlement — 42 C.F.R. § 417.810: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/417.810
More from Oral Arguments, with Context
Two products with nearly the same name lead to a trademark dispute. Amarte sells an eye cream called EYECONIC. Kendo and Marc Jacobs sold EYE-CONIC eye shadow through retailers including Sephora. Amarte says the name confused consumers about who made or authorized the products. It sued in 2022, after Kendo had discontinued the line. The district judge ruled for the defendants without a trial. That was summary judgment: a decision that no genuine dispute about facts material to the result required a trial, and the defendants were entitled to win under the law. Looking at packaging, prominent company names and other marketplace evidence, the judge found no triable likelihood of confusion. Much of this argument turns on two kinds of confusion. Forward confusion means a buyer thinks the defendants' eye shadow comes from, or is sponsored by, Amarte. Reverse confusion goes the other way: a buyer thinks the Amarte product comes from the larger Marc Jacobs business. The concern is that a bigger brand may overwhelm a smaller, earlier user of a name. The district court addressed forward confusion and concluded that reverse confusion had not been pleaded. The judges will press Amarte on whether its complaint and briefs properly preserved the arguments it now wants to make. Amarte will insist both theories were in the case and that its consumer survey required a jury's consideration. The defendants will argue that it cannot change theories on appeal. The defendants will also invoke laches: a defense based on unreasonable delay in suing that prejudices the other side. A separate award of defense legal fees is also at issue. The law allows those fees in exceptional cases, not simply because one side lost. Celeste Butera of Lippes Mathias will present Amarte's appeal first.
A traffic maneuver in Paducah, Kentucky, leads to a federal gun prosecution. In February 2021, Haynes drove to the right of a stopped car and then turned right at an intersection. An officer following him considered that improper lane use and pulled him over. The officer also wanted to investigate an encounter four months earlier, when a driver in a stolen car had fled from police. He believed Haynes was that driver. During the February stop, officers directed Haynes out of his car. Another officer saw a gun in the driver's door. Because Haynes had a prior felony conviction, the gun led to the federal charge at issue here. Haynes asked the district court to suppress the gun: to exclude it from evidence on the ground that police had obtained it through an unconstitutional stop. The judge denied that request. The judge concluded that the initial stop rested on an objectively reasonable interpretation of Kentucky traffic law, even if that interpretation might ultimately be mistaken. The appeal focuses on that initial decision to stop the car. Kentucky's rules distinguish passing on the right from driving off the roadway, and the parties disagree about how those rules fit this intersection and maneuver. Crossing a white line does not, by itself, answer which statute was violated. Haynes's lawyer will argue that the officer lacked a lawful basis for the stop and that the government cannot repair that gap with new theories developed afterward. The government will defend the stop under the traffic rules and the doctrine of reasonable mistakes of law. That doctrine does not mean any sincere misunderstanding is enough. The mistake must be objectively reasonable; careless study of the law gets no special protection. The lawyers will begin with those competing views.
The Sixth Circuit considers communication access during a hospital stay. In February 2023, Spencer, a deaf patient, was admitted to Union Hospital in Ohio and later transferred to Cleveland Clinic's main campus, where she underwent surgery. Her chart said she needed an American Sign Language interpreter. The hospitals used video remote interpreting, or VRI: a video connection to a sign language interpreter. But some attempts were unsuccessful, and staff also communicated through written notes and phone-based speech-to-text. Spencer says communication failures left her without full access to medical information and left family members filling gaps. She and her two daughters sued. The district judge ruled for the hospitals on the federal claim under the Affordable Care Act, which prohibits disability discrimination in covered health programs. The judge considered the interpreting services and alternative methods together, and relied on Spencer's testimony about understanding her procedure. The appeal concerns communication rights, not an allegation that the surgery was performed incorrectly. The ruling was summary judgment, a decision without trial when no genuine dispute over an outcome-relevant fact remains and the law entitles one side to win. Here, the question is whether the record allowed that decision or required a trial. A judge cannot simply choose between competing versions of a genuinely disputed material fact. The family will argue that important medical conversations were not effectively accessible, regardless of the eventual medical outcome. The hospitals will point to completed interpreting calls and testimony that Spencer understood her care. The judges will also press counsel on the daughters' separate communication claims and whether those claims were addressed. Another question is what showing of intentional discrimination is required for nominal damages: a small award recognizing a proven legal violation rather than compensating a demonstrated loss. Seeking that award does not by itself establish a right to it. Andrew Rozynski will present the family's appeal first.
The Sixth Circuit returns to a dispute over Harry Calcutt the Third, a former chief executive of Northwestern Bank in Michigan. During the Great Recession, the bank's largest group of borrowers stopped making loan payments. A restructuring called the Bedrock Transaction provided funds to bring their loans current. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation found that Calcutt approved unsafe transactions and concealed the troubled relationship from the bank's board and regulators. Calcutt contests the agency's case. In 2023, the Supreme Court reversed an earlier Sixth Circuit judgment. After identifying errors in the agency's reasoning, the appeals court should have sent the case back rather than supplying its own justification for the sanctions. That was not a ruling clearing Calcutt of misconduct. The FDIC reconsidered the matter and again imposed a banking prohibition and a civil penalty of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars. Calcutt now challenges that renewed decision. The court first examines whether his constitutional objections can be considered now. A limited remand restricts what may be reopened when a case is sent back. Appellate forfeiture concerns an argument not raised in an earlier appeal. The parties dispute both the scope of the remand and the consequences of Calcutt's earlier briefing. The constitutional questions concern a federal judge under Article Three and a civil jury under the Seventh Amendment. The public-rights exception permits Congress to assign certain matters to agencies instead. Calcutt will argue that this case concerns traditional private duties that require court adjudication. The FDIC will defend its administrative process as part of protecting the federally insured banking system. There is also a dispute over proximate cause: whether the alleged misconduct is sufficiently connected to the bank's losses, rather than merely preceding them. Calcutt will question whether the agency showed the bank would have been better off without the transaction. The FDIC will defend its findings. Amy Saharia of Williams and Connolly will present Calcutt's challenge first.
The Fifth Circuit reviews a contested settlement over Charles Schwab's acquisition of TD Ameritrade. Individual investors claimed the merger reduced competition in the market for retail customer orders. Their complaint was not simply that stock prices fell. It was that reduced competition left customers with less favorable trading prices and rebates. The business model matters. Brokers can receive payments from market makers for routing customers' buy and sell orders to them. That is payment for order flow. The investors claimed that, after the merger, less of the benefit reached customers. The Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions whose effect may substantially lessen competition; these allegations were not a trial finding that Schwab violated that law. After discovery and mediation, the parties agreed to a settlement covering roughly twenty-five million current brokerage customers. It calls for an antitrust compliance program designed with a consultant, rather than breaking up the merged business. Ordinary class members receive no cash distribution. The named plaintiffs receive separate payments. Members were not given an option to opt out of this mandatory class. The district judge approved the settlement and eight and a quarter million dollars in attorney's fees, payable by Schwab. The objectors challenging approval include Iowa and a customer representing himself. They will question the program's uncertain benefits, the fees, and the effect on customers' ability to pursue damages together. The original plaintiffs and Schwab will defend the agreement as a valuable compromise and emphasize that absent class members' individual damages claims are not released. Formal preservation of those claims and the practical ability to pursue them are different issues in this argument. The court first turns to standing: the required legal stake in federal litigation, involving a concrete injury traceable to the challenged conduct that the requested relief can redress. It will examine Iowa's ability to appeal and the named customers' ability to seek prospective relief. The Class Action Fairness Act requires notice to appropriate government officials; how that bears on Iowa's participation is disputed. For the fee discussion, a lodestar calculation starts with reasonable hours multiplied by reasonable hourly rates. The dispute includes whether the judge properly assessed the results obtained, not just the lawyers' time. Eric Wessan will present Iowa's challenge first.