Show Notes
In podcast episode 128, posted just before Operation Epic Fury began, I outlined how I think that an attack on Iran could be just, necessary, and what I perceived as a path to achieve the goals expressed by the U.S. Government in the weeks leading to the start of the war. I did not expect this to be a blueprint for what would actually happen. What I really did not expect was for the conduct of the war to be completely different that that. So different that more than the usual naysayers are questioning whether this war is just at all, or winnable. In this episode I go beyond the Just War Theory I used in my previous analysis, using the Weinberger-Powell model for the use of military force. This model is credited with successful use of American military force in the last decade and a half of the 20th century. Although it is not, and was never intended as a recipe for success, abandoning its thought process seems to have been a formula for failure. As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
Dedication to my sons, 1st Lt Miles Mayer USAF and PFC Charles Mayer USA. With the commitment to our future military engagements being jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (1984) Promulgated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Believed to have been written by then Maj Gen Colin Powell, his senior military assistant.
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved. S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.
General Colin Powell’s re-statement of the Doctrine in 1992, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Is a vital national security interest threatened? Do we have a clear attainable objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted? Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? Is the action supported by the American people? Do we have genuine broad international support?
If after careful consideration of these questions, the decision is made to commit U.S. military forces, then two imperatives shall apply:
Clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives. When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively.
Reference: Powell, C. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93 Music: Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
More from The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare
It seems to be popular to publish lists of five, seven, or more items that represent whatever the author thinks it is important for others to know. For this episode, I decided to go along with this trend. I came up with seven deadly sins in fighting a war. These sins, things never to do, apply to the decision to go to war – this includes the decisions associated with defending one’s nation when attacked.
Is Just War Theory still relevant to war and war fighting in the world today? Are the criteria of Just Cause, Right Intent, Legitimate Authority, and Proportionality, and Last Resort tools to restrain nations from going to war, or have these principles been twisted into excuses for going to war. This is part of the argument Pope Leo XIV makes in his recent Encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas, in which he is reported to say that Just War Theory is outdated. Is this true? If so, what does it mean? That is the subject of this episode of The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Every August and September, the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan in 1945 seems to be a topic of discussion. This year, I decided to take that on and place it into the Just War framework, specifically jus in bello, or justice in the conduct of war. Just War Theory is a recurring topic in this podcast series. I believe that this framework is critical as a restraint on war and to establishing a just and lasting peace after war. (I still intend on addressing Pope Leo’s statement that Just War Theory is outdated.) This episode builds on information my guests and I presented in previous episodes, and particularly Episodes 13-16, and Episode 17 which described Just War Theory in theory and practice. As a side note, the web service that hosts these podcasts informed me that the episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare now have 50,000 downloads. I know that many podcasters get this for a single episode. Since I don’t do this for the clicks, but just to share my thoughts on war, I was somewhat impressed that so many people bothered to download my thoughts. Thank you.
The common definition of a mercenary is a soldier paid to fight in an armed conflict for a country that is not his or her own. The terrorist organization Hizballah operates in Lebanon, fighting against Israel, with financial, material and organizational support from Iran, and frequently under the direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Under the common definition, could Hizballah be considered mercenaries fighting for Iran? Royce de Melo, Doug Brooks, and I discuss this question in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Is war rational? The great philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, was a product of three schools of education: the classical tradition of Aristotle, the enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and the practical experience of Napoleon. Each of these three challenged and opposed the other two. His work, On War expresses this tension and opposition. In his effort to develop a comprehensive theory of war, he had to deal with the many instances where the reality of war seemed to defy any coherent framework, where the things which should happen in war are contradicted by what actually happens. (This fits with his assigning the element of probability and chance to the military leg of his famous triad.) “Consequently,” he wrote, “it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments…” If it did, he concluded, then in the end, war would never need to be fought. But wars are fought. Is war itself then, irrational?