Criminal Law Department Presents – CAAF Chats Ep 74: United States v. Downum (C.A.A.F. 2025)

In this episode, we review the discovery and disclosure rules under R.C.M. 701 and R.C.M. 703, highlighting the tension between a victim's Fourth Amendment privacy rights in digital evidence and the accused's statutory right to discovery. We examine whether the military judge erred in denying defense access to a complete forensic data extraction of the victim's cell phone when the government held physical possession of the data, but the victim had consented only to a limited, location-related search. We provide key takeaways on the strategic trial application of the harmless error standard, the evolving definition of physical possession in the digital age, and the broader appellate trajectory of balancing Fourth versus Sixth Amendment rights in military courts.

In this episode, we review the residual hearsay exception under M.R.E. 807 and the Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense under Chambers v. Mississippi. We examine whether the military judge arbitrarily excluded a third party's recorded confession and apology letter to the victim's parents, and whether admitting that evidence for impeachment alone infringed a weighty interest of the accused. We provide takeaways on the current trustworthiness standard, the line between judicial gatekeeping and panel credibility determinations, and the appellate risk of excluding exculpatory evidence.

In this episode, we review the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) and the Frost and Finch factors that govern each subsection. We examine whether a victim's statements to law enforcement were admissible to rehabilitate credibility attacked on the “other ground” of faulty memory in Ruiz, and of inconsistency in Brown, along with CAAF's clarification of Ayala on when both subsections may apply. We provide takeaways on anticipating impeachment, making strategic decisions about highlighting inconsistencies, and using bench briefs to frame the issue for the military judge.

In this episode, we review the CAAF's ruling that a defense counsel's statement of “no motions” at arraignment constituted an affirmative, express waiver of a multiplicity challenge to duplicative Article 128b domestic violence specifications. We examine the tension between waiver and forfeiture, the majority's reliance on the absence of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the dissent's concern that constitutional double jeopardy rights were relinquished without any showing the accused personally understood or intended to give them up. We also discuss the still-unresolved question, left open in both Malone and the subsequent Ford decision, of what constitutes the “unit of prosecution” for Article 128b offenses, and provide takeaways for practitioners on documenting client conversations, charging strategy for “super specs,” and preserving multiplicity issues for appeal.

In this episode, we review whether a suspect's statement, “I would like to speak to a lawyer, but um, yeah,” was an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel under Article 31, UCMJ principles. We examine how the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applied Edwards v. Arizona and Davis v. United States, and how the majority and dissent split over whether the words “but um, yeah” were meaningless filler words or introduced genuine ambiguity into the invocation. We provide takeaways for practitioners on evaluating motions to suppress based on the precise wording of a client's request for counsel.