Episode 107: Cristobal Otero on the Effect of Managers on Public Hospital Performance
The Visible HandShow Notes
This paper studies the effect of managers for the performance of public hospitals, specifically following a reform in Chile that changed their recruitment process. The main findings are that the reform decreased mortality, likely through the mechanism of improving the quality of managers (e.g., replacing managers without management degrees with managers with management degrees).
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