USA v. McCandless — 9th Cir. (Oct 15, 2026)

Wright-El challenges a prison disciplinary hearing over alleged weapon possession and smuggling at New York's Clinton Correctional Facility. He received a three-hundred-day segregation penalty and says he was denied evidence needed to defend himself. He used section nineteen eighty-three, a federal civil-rights law, to sue in federal court. A judge ruled for hearing officer Bishop without a trial. Summary judgment permits that when no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result remains, and the law entitles one side to win. The evidence dispute concerns recalling an inmate witness, an officer's memorandum and facility video. The parties dispute what video existed and what it could have shown, and which materials were properly before the district court. Prison hearings are not criminal trials. Under Wolff versus McDonnell, prisoners may call witnesses and present documents, subject to institutional safety and correctional needs. Cumulative evidence merely repeats a point already in the record. The appeal also seeks to revive claims about COVID exposure and untreated pain. Wright-El's advocates say the court should have permitted another amended complaint; the defense disputes whether the pleadings identified a responsible official's deliberate indifference. Section nineteen fifteen A requires early screening of prisoners' suits against government officials. Sua sponte means the court acts on its own initiative. Deliberate indifference means knowing disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm, not merely negligent care. In camera means private judicial review. Remand sends a case back for further proceedings. Qualified immunity protects officials from damages unless they violated clearly established rights. Carter Massengill and Benjamin Cooper from Seton Hall Law School's Center for Social Justice will seek further proceedings for Wright-El. Sarah Rosenbluth for Bishop will defend the hearing and the dismissal of the medical claims.

Andre Taylor challenges Michigan sexual-assault convictions. A woman he met at a bar said he assaulted her at her apartment after giving her a ride home; Taylor maintained that the sex was consensual. On his lawyer's advice, he did not testify. The trial judge ruled that without his testimony there would be no consent instruction and his lawyer could not explicitly argue that defense. His lawyer instead challenged the prosecution's evidence of force or coercion, while keeping potentially damaging statements to police away from the jury. After a hearing into the lawyer's performance, the trial judge ordered a new trial. Michigan calls that kind of evidentiary proceeding a Ginther hearing. The state appeals court reversed, and a federal judge denied habeas relief. Habeas corpus challenges the lawfulness of custody, not the charges in a new trial. Under Strickland, ineffective assistance requires both objectively deficient representation and prejudice: a reasonable probability of a different outcome without the error. AEDPA, the federal habeas law, adds deference to the state court's ruling. Disagreement with that court is not enough to establish an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. An element is something the prosecution must prove. An affirmative defense offers an additional legal reason to avoid conviction. Here, the judges will examine whether challenging force or coercion effectively presented the consent theory. Sanford Schulman for Taylor will argue that mistaken advice prevented an informed decision to testify. Scott Shimkus for the warden will defend the strategy of challenging force or coercion without exposing Taylor to cross-examination.

Brandon Fulton seeks payment for horses authorities seized during an animal-cruelty investigation. Criminal charges were later dropped, but he alleges the horses were never returned and he was not paid. He sued the Fulton County Board of Commissioners in Georgia. A federal judge dismissed his claim and refused permission to amend the complaint to sue the county directly under the Constitution. The full Eleventh Circuit is rehearing the appeal en banc, rather than the usual three-judge panel. The prior panel opinion has been vacated. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires just compensation for private property taken for public use. A cause of action is the legal authorization to bring a particular kind of lawsuit; that is distinct from the underlying constitutional right. Section nineteen eighty-three is a civil-rights statute. Under Monell, local-government liability under that statute requires a connection to an official policy or custom, not merely an employee's wrongdoing. An inverse-condemnation claim is an owner's suit for compensation for an alleged government taking. In a 2024 Texas case, the Supreme Court left the direct-suit question open because state law supplied another route. The Tucker Act comes up as an analogy: it gives a federal claims court jurisdiction over certain money claims against the United States. This case is against a county, not the federal government. Fulton's lawyer will argue that the Takings Clause itself authorizes his claim. The county will argue that statutory and state-law procedures control and Fulton failed to use them properly. It also disputes that the alleged seizure was a compensable taking.

Doctor Colin Clarke and his medical practice challenge an order stopping them from pursuing insurance payments from GEICO. The dispute involves medical bills under New York's no-fault automobile insurance system, which pays certain accident-related expenses without deciding who caused the crash. Patients can assign their payment claims to providers, and disputed bills can go to arbitration. GEICO sued in federal court, alleging unnecessary medical treatment, inflated billing and control of the practice by unlicensed people. Clarke disputes those allegations. Meanwhile, his side was pursuing many individual payment arbitrations. Judge Block paused pending arbitrations and barred new collection proceedings while the fraud case continues. This preliminary injunction is a temporary order, not a final finding that Clarke committed fraud. Clarke says he and other witnesses should have been allowed to testify before that order. An evidentiary hearing lets the judge hear witnesses and test disputed evidence, rather than deciding only on papers such as affidavits, or sworn written statements. Wesley Mead of the Mead Law Firm will argue for Clarke that specific factual disputes required a hearing. Evan Krinick will argue for GEICO that Clarke did not identify a sufficient basis for one. You will also hear about Mayzenberg. That New York ruling distinguishes professional misconduct, such as improper referral payments, from surrendering control of a practice to unlicensed people. It does not make bills for unnecessary services automatically payable. The appeal concerns the temporary freeze and the procedure used to impose it, not a final trial of the underlying fraud allegations.

A loan on an Ohio water park leads to a dispute over who should receive insurance money. Sinmier lent Vintro seven million dollars against the Maui Sands Resort and Waterpark. After water damage, Everest paid the property owner to settle an insurance claim, without including Sinmier. Vintro defaulted. Sinmier later accepted title to the property in a settlement that, in the district court's view, fully satisfied the mortgage debt. Sinmier says the insurance arrangements should have protected it as mortgagee, meaning the lender holding the mortgage, rather than merely as an additional insured for liability claims. It sued the insurer and insurance intermediaries. The district court ruled for Everest, EverSports and Bankers without a trial. That is summary judgment: a decision under the law when no genuine dispute over a fact material to the result requires a trial. Sinmier's lawyer, Matthew Henzi, will argue that coverage questions and separate negligence claims require further proceedings. Chris Yingling for Bankers and Daniel Gourash for Everest and EverSports will defend those judgments. The questions include whether Everest agreed to name Sinmier under the property coverage, and whether accepting the deed extinguished its insurance-related rights. A deed in lieu of foreclosure transfers the property to the lender instead of completing a foreclosure sale. A binder is temporary insurance coverage; a third-party beneficiary seeks to enforce a contract made for its benefit. You will also hear about the economic-loss rule, which generally bars negligence recovery for purely financial loss without an independent legal duty. The judges also ask whether Sinmier presented its arguments to the district court.