McCartney v. City of New York — 2d Cir. (Oct 23, 2026)

The Second Circuit hears Tony Kirik’s appeal from federal convictions arising from his trucking business. Prosecutors said he concealed links between trucking companies so a new company would not inherit another company’s negative safety history. A jury convicted him. He now challenges both the evidence supporting his convictions and the performance of his trial lawyer. His appellate lawyer will argue that the defense failed to examine important discovery, meaning documents shared before trial, and missed opportunities to challenge witnesses who linked him to false filings. The government will dispute that the existing record establishes what counsel did, why, or whether it affected the outcome. The usual Strickland test has two parts: representation below an objective standard of professional reasonableness, and prejudice to the defense. Prejudice means a reasonable probability of a different result without the lawyer’s errors, enough to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is not enough simply to identify poor lawyering. The judges will ask whether to decide that claim now, send it back for factual findings, or leave it for a separate post-conviction proceeding. Section 2255 allows certain federal prisoners to challenge an unlawful conviction or sentence in the sentencing court. That forum can develop evidence about counsel’s choices. Leaving the claim for that process would not itself mean the lawyer’s performance was adequate. The separate evidence challenge asks whether a rational jury could find the crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution. It is not a fresh trial of witness credibility.

The Sixth Circuit hears a former professor’s suit against a tribal community college in Michigan. Jesse Koenig says college officials falsified information for their accreditor, and that he lost his job after reporting his concerns. He sued the college and three officials, including for retaliation under the False Claims Act. The district court dismissed the suit on tribal sovereign immunity grounds, without deciding whether the alleged retaliation occurred. Tribal sovereign immunity generally protects a tribe from being sued unless Congress authorizes the suit or the tribe clearly waives immunity. An arm of the tribe is an entity that shares that protection because of its relationship to the tribal government. The parties dispute whether this college qualifies, given its separate corporate form, governance and financial arrangements. The judges will discuss a recent Supreme Court decision holding that New Jersey Transit does not share New Jersey’s sovereign immunity. That decision emphasizes legal separateness and responsibility for judgments. The professor’s lawyer will argue that its reasoning applies here. The college will argue that its tribal status and the federal tribal-education framework make this case different. There is also a distinct question about the three officials. A personal-capacity suit seeks to hold people individually liable, rather than suing their office. Courts look at who would actually be legally bound, not just the names on the complaint. The False Claims Act protects certain lawful anti-fraud efforts from retaliation. Whether it permits these individual claims is separate from whether tribal immunity blocks them.

The Second Circuit considers an unpaid charter-school funding dispute. Federal money awarded to New York in 2011 was supposed to reach schools through the state education department. Some of that money expired before it was drawn down. Schools say they were left with approved expenses that had not been reimbursed. The state asked the federal Education Department for permission to use money from a separate 2018 grant to fill that gap. The department refused, and the schools challenged that refusal. The district court ruled for the federal government, concluding the department lacked legal authority to grant the request. The older grant operated under No Child Left Behind; the newer one under the Every Student Succeeds Act. Both support charter schools, but the parties disagree about how far the money and the rules can carry over. An appropriation is Congress's authorization to spend federal money for specified purposes; a grant is an award made under that authority. The Purpose Statute generally limits spending to those purposes, unless another law provides otherwise. A waiver permits an agency to set aside a particular requirement. The charter-school law gives the education secretary limited waiver authority over requirements the secretary administers. The schools will contend that this authority allows the department to consider their request. The government will argue that using newer funds for older obligations crosses a congressional spending limit that the secretary cannot waive. This is a dispute about the agency's legal power, not simply whether paying these school expenses would be a good policy choice.

The Second Circuit hears a New York City property-tax dispute brought by Ben Umeze. The city changed the tax classification of the property where he runs his medical practice. He says that led to higher taxes and violated his constitutional right to due process. He sued in federal court, seeking a different classification and money damages. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and refused to let him amend his complaint. Subject-matter jurisdiction means a court's legal authority to hear this kind of dispute. The Tax Injunction Act generally prevents federal district courts from blocking state or local tax assessment or collection when a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is available in state court. A related principle called comity reflects federal courts' restraint toward state tax administration. It can also bar damages claims when state remedies adequately protect federal rights. The question is whether this lawsuit belongs in federal court, not simply whether the property was correctly classified. Umeze will seek another chance to pursue his constitutional challenge and amend his complaint. The city will maintain that state tax-review procedures supply the proper route and that amendment would not overcome the federal-court barriers. Listen for the distinction between challenging a tax assessment and challenging the procedure that produced it. You will also hear about nominal damages: a small monetary award recognizing a legal violation without requiring proof of a measurable financial loss. Asking for that remedy does not, by itself, remove the other barriers to hearing a case.

The Second Circuit hears Griffin's challenge to a two-point-four-million-dollar restitution order. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to bribe a town employee for access to a Cortlandt dumping facility, and to a separate wire-fraud conspiracy involving sham bids for public work. He received a two-year prison term and was ordered to pay for damage to town property and neighboring wetlands owned by the Westchester Land Trust. Restitution compensates victims for losses from a crime; it is separate from a fine or prison term. The argument concerns whether Griffin can challenge that payment while keeping his guilty plea and the benefits of his plea agreement. His agreement includes an appeal waiver: a promise not to challenge certain matters in a higher court. His lawyer will contend that ineffective legal assistance in agreeing to the amount allows this challenge to proceed. The government will defend the waiver and the sentencing court's reliance on the agreement and other evidence. You will hear about a stipulation, meaning a fact or figure the parties agreed to accept. Such an agreement can support a sentence, but the judge must consider the record as a whole. A Fatico hearing takes evidence on disputed sentencing facts. Here, the parties disagree whether the written agreement and existing record were sufficient without another hearing. Griffin also requests a Jacobson remand: a limited return to the district court for more findings or a supplemented record, after which the appeal can return without a new notice of appeal. He will seek further review of restitution without undoing his guilty plea. The government will resist what it sees as keeping the favorable parts of the deal while discarding an agreed restriction.