USA v. Scott — 9th Cir. (Oct 15, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit considers a car search underlying a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. An officer in training said he saw a glass pipe during a traffic stop, but mistook it for a lawful marijuana accessory. The pipe was later identified as methamphetamine paraphernalia. The district judge credited the officer's testimony and upheld the search despite his mistaken understanding of the pipe. The defense will dispute the pipe's visibility and argue that the search must be judged on facts the officer actually understood at the time. The government will defend the search based on what a reasonable officer would have recognized. Probable cause to search means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. Under the automobile exception, probable cause can allow a car search without a warrant. California law adds another issue: specified lawful cannabis conduct cannot itself be a basis for detention, search or arrest. The argument also tests whether federal drug law can justify a search by state officers despite that state-law restriction.

The Sixth Circuit hears South Elkhorn Village's dispute over a delayed sewer connection in Georgetown, Kentucky. The company bought undeveloped commercial land covered by a recorded subdivision map, or plat, and an earlier certification of sewer capacity. When it sought service, the utility applied new rules and placed its request in a queue, citing limited capacity. The company says the delay obstructed development and unlawfully undermined rights secured by the earlier certification. The request eventually received conditional approval, yet the company challenged the delay in court. The district court dismissed its constitutional and state-law claims. South Elkhorn will argue that the utility exceeded its authority and that the judge resolved disputed facts before discovery. The city and utility will defend their power to manage sewer capacity and deny any unconditional right to an immediate connection. Police power here means government's authority to regulate for public health and safety. The dispute also concerns a Kentucky statute governing cancellation of subdivision-map approval, and limits on local authority where state law controls. At this dismissal stage, courts generally accept well-pleaded facts as true, but not bare legal conclusions; the complaint must still plausibly support a legal claim.

The Second Circuit hears a class-action dispute over traffic enforcement in Buffalo, New York. Drivers allege police used checkpoints for general crime control and concentrated them in Black and Latino neighborhoods. They also allege Black and Latino motorists disproportionately received multiple tinted-window tickets during a single stop. They sued the city and police officials for civil-rights violations and damages. The district court certified two damages classes: one involving checkpoint stops, the other multiple tinted-window tickets. The city defendants now challenge that class certification, not a final damages judgment. Under Rule Twenty-Three, commonality asks whether a shared question can produce an answer for the class; predominance asks whether common issues outweigh individual ones. The defendants will contend that each person's stop, injury and damages require separate proof. The plaintiffs will respond that citywide practices and shared evidence permit collective treatment. You'll also hear Monell: a city is liable under federal civil-rights law for constitutional harm caused by its policy or custom, not automatically for every wrong by an employee.

The Sixth Circuit hears Linney's Pizza's challenge to the rules behind merchants' debit-card fees. An interchange fee compensates the card-issuing bank; merchants bear it through their payment-processing charges. Linney's says the Federal Reserve's Regulation Two allows costs Congress excluded, making the fee cap too high. The district court upheld the rule; Linney's now appeals. The Durbin Amendment requires fees to be reasonable and proportional to issuers' transaction costs. The lawyers use A-C-S for authorization, clearance and settlement, the steps involved in processing a debit payment. The disputed provision requires consideration of incremental A-C-S costs and excludes costs not specific to a particular transaction. Linney's will argue that Congress created only two cost categories; the Board will defend a reading that permits additional transaction-related costs. Banking associations will also defend the rule. Another recurring name is Loper Bright, the Supreme Court decision requiring judges to interpret statutes independently rather than defer just because the text is ambiguous. It still permits Congress to delegate policy choices to agencies within legal limits.

The Ninth Circuit hears a contract dispute arising from allegations of online gambling with Robux. Robux is the virtual currency used on Roblox, an online gaming platform. Children who allegedly lost that currency on outside gambling websites sued Roblox and people alleged to run those sites. This appeal is not a ruling on whether the gambling was unlawful. It concerns one defendant's request to send claims to arbitration, a process for deciding disputes outside the usual court trial. The district court denied that request. The defendant will seek a trial on whether an arbitration agreement was formed; the plaintiffs will defend the denial. Listen for the difference between actually knowing a website's terms and being given sufficiently clear notice of them. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, without actual knowledge, online contract formation requires reasonably conspicuous notice and an unambiguous indication of agreement. Section four of the Federal Arbitration Act provides a trial when formation is genuinely in dispute; whether this record presents such a dispute is the point of contention.