South Elkhorn Village v. City of Georgetown — 6th Cir. (Oct 20, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit hears a dispute over oil-development rights in Ventura County. The two Peak companies held an oil and gas lease and operated wells. They say the county's clearance decisions shut down their operations and deprived them of valuable lease rights. They sued for a taking without compensation. The county pursued its own claims over code violations and penalties. Peak wants to appeal the dismissal of its takings claim, not the county's later award. But after its lawyer withdrew, Peak did not obtain replacement counsel, and the county obtained a default judgment. A counterclaim is a claim brought back against the party that sued. A default judgment can follow a failure to defend against such a claim. You'll hear Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns a complaint that fails to state a legal claim, and Rule 41(b), which addresses failure to pursue litigation or obey court orders. You'll also hear merger: the principle under which earlier nonfinal rulings can become reviewable with the final judgment. Not every order necessarily merges. Peak will argue that it fully litigated its takings claim and should not have to contest the county's separate claims just to preserve an appeal. The county will argue that Peak's nonparticipation and failure to seek relief from the default prevent review of the earlier ruling. The judges must sort out that procedural question before they can reach the underlying property dispute.

The Sixth Circuit considers a dispute over Nashville's sidewalk requirements for property development. To obtain building permits, owners and developers could be required to build or replace a sidewalk, or pay an in-lieu fee into a city sidewalk fund. In lieu means instead of building the sidewalk themselves. Some owners paid the fees and later brought takings claims, seeking compensation for what they call unconstitutional conditions on development. The district court allowed some timely takings claims to proceed. The city now brings an early appeal before final judgment, not an appeal from a final award of refunds. The Fifth Amendment prohibits taking private property for public use without just compensation. A permit exaction is a demand for money or property as a condition of permission to develop. Calling something an exaction does not by itself establish that it is unlawful. The city will argue that payment was voluntary because the owners could have sought a waiver or variance. It will also argue that, without such a request, its demands were not final. The owners will argue that paying a required fee to get a permit was not a free choice, and that the city had already made its position clear. Finality asks whether the government has settled what it requires. Exhaustion means using available administrative remedies. Those are different questions: a conclusive government position need not await exhaustion, but a genuinely unsettled demand may not yet be ready for court.

The Ninth Circuit considers a nurse's claims about missed meal and rest breaks. The nurse brought proposed class actions against Memorial Health Services and Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, alleging unpaid wages and other violations of California labor law. The hospitals want the meal-and-rest-break claims resolved through arbitration under contracts negotiated with her union. A collective bargaining agreement is that union-negotiated employment contract. Arbitration puts a dispute before an arbitrator rather than a judge. California Labor Code section 226.7 provides additional pay for covered employees when legally required breaks are not provided. Her statutory claims arise from law, separately from promises in the contract. Agreeing to arbitrate those claims concerns the forum, not surrendering the underlying legal protections. The question is whether the two successive contracts clearly and unmistakably require these statutory claims to be arbitrated. The hospitals will argue that the contracts must be read as a whole. The nurse will argue that promising to follow state law is not enough to waive access to court. Another term you will hear is unconscionability: an objection that contract terms are too unfair to enforce. The argument concerns where these claims may proceed, not a final finding that the hospitals violated the break laws.

The Sixth Circuit hears the Kouza brothers' consolidated appeals from a Michigan pharmacy fraud trial. Prosecutors accused the brothers of billing Medicare, Medicaid, and a private insurer for prescriptions that were never fully dispensed, including bills left unreversed when patients did not collect their medication. A jury convicted both brothers of conspiracy in 2024. They are challenging their criminal judgments. The evidence included pharmacy billing and inventory records, as well as testimony from people who worked at the pharmacies. A proposed defense witness declined to testify after prosecutors raised concerns about his possible criminal exposure. The brothers will argue that this improperly disrupted their defense; the government will dispute that account. The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incriminating testimony: answers that could expose the witness to criminal liability. The judges will also discuss plain-error review, a demanding standard for correcting an error that was not properly raised in the trial court. Later, the argument turns to a sentencing increase based on managerial responsibility, and to forfeiture: court-ordered surrender of money or property derived from the crime. The questions include how extensive the activity was, and whether the forfeiture amount violates the constitutional ban on excessive fines.

The Ninth Circuit hears a dispute over San Jose firefighters' overtime pay. The firefighters worked rotating shifts, received paid leave, and could earn additional pay for extra shifts under their labor agreement. They sued the city, claiming that its payments sometimes fell short of federal overtime requirements, especially when paid leave and extra work occurred in the same pay period. After a trial based on stipulated facts and documents, a federal judge found underpayments. The city is appealing. These firefighters use a special federal rule: overtime is measured after 212 hours actually worked in a 28-day period, rather than the usual 40-hour week. The dispute is not whether firefighters can receive overtime. It is how to calculate it. One question concerns the regular rate, the hourly benchmark for federal overtime: should the salary be divided by fixed scheduled hours, or by hours actually worked? Another concerns credit: how much of the overtime already paid under the labor agreement counts toward what federal law requires? The city will defend its calculations. The firefighters will defend the trial court's method and its limits on those credits.