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19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments

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Summary

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In a recent class discussion, the focus shifts to game theory, specifically the concepts of imperfect information and strategies within games. The instructor introduces the idea of sub-game perfection, refining the Nash equilibrium concept to ensure players act optimally in every sub-game. Through interactive examples, students engage in a game titled "Don't Screw Up," where they analyze decision-making processes and trust dynamics between players. The instructor highlights the importance of backward induction in determining optimal strategies and emphasizes the need for players to trust one another to achieve the best outcomes.

The session culminates in a more complex example involving a matchmaker scenario, illustrating how strategic decisions can influence outcomes in competitive environments. The discussion underscores the significance of considering the reactions of other players when making decisions, as neglecting these strategic effects can lead to suboptimal choices. The instructor concludes with a reminder that understanding these dynamics is crucial for effective decision-making in both academic and real-world contexts.

Show Notes

Game Theory (ECON 159)Uploaded 20-11-08We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. We show the other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The second game involves a matchmaker sending a couple on a date. There are three Nash equilibria in the dating subgame. We construct three corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game by rolling back each of the equilibrium payoffs from the subgame. Finally, we analyze a game in which a firm has to decide whether to invest in a machine that will reduce its costs of production. We learn that the strategic effects of this decision--its effect on the choices of other competing firms--can be large, and if we ignore them we will make mistakes.00:00 - Chapter 1. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Example27:22 - Chapter 2. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Matchmaking34:31 - Chapter 3. Matchmaking: SPEs of the Game49:37 - Chapter 4. Sub-game Perfect Equilibria: Strategic Investments01:13:15 - Chapter 5. Strategic Investments: DiscussionComplete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.eduThis course was recorded in Fall 2007. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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